Kenneth Burke’s Identification and Consubstantiality

Another in the line of “8 Burkean concepts that are better than the Pentad” are the paired concepts of Identification and Consubstantiality. For our purposes, I’ll treat them together.

Enigmatically, Burke states that Identity is not individual. Rather than Identity being a thing that we are, it’s more of a relationship we build. Burke states “a man [sic] ‘identifies himself’ with all sorts of manifestations beyond himself” (ATH 263). Thus we go out and find people that we think are like us, companies, activities and objects we like or enjoy, people we aspire to be and positions we aspire to be in. Once that happens, we see ourselves as “of the same substance” or consubstantial.

Burke calls this process “Natural,” and says that it’s a “function of sociality” (ATH 265-7), which is to say, that because we are social creatures, living within a society, and perhaps because man [sic] is “moved by a sense of order,” we “naturally” seek to align ourselves with things.

What makes this a GENIUS concept from Burke, is that what he essentially does is note that identification is the primary function of rhetoric and persuasion; that we are persuaded or persuade ourselves that we are or are like something else (Americans, hamburger lovers, White/Black, skydivers, cisgender/Queer, etc).

Perhaps we put ourselves in categories “naturally,” but others can also work to persuade us to join categories.

A is not identical with his colleague, B.  But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B.  Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so (RM 20).

So if I can persuade you to think of yourself as a White, Middle-class, cisgender male, I can to a certain extent predict how you will respond–and I can pick which aspects I want you to think of as primary, which secondary, etc.

However, there’s a bit of a paradox in all of this:

“Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division.  Identification is compensatory to division.  If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (RM 22).

So whenever you hear someone say, “I’m like you…” or “Don’t you, as a ____ feel…” your ears should perk up. When they say “You’re like me!” you should pause and say, “Am I, though? Do I really want to be?” And perhaps you should ask, “Cui bono?” Who benefits from me being this and acting this way?

Questions? Comments? Thoughts?

Sources:

Kenneth Burke. Attitudes Toward History.

Kenneth Burke. Rhetoric of Motive.