Sigmund Freud’s Jokes part A. II. b. 3. The Techniques of Conceptual Jokes – Faulty Reasoning

This is the tenth of several installments on Sigmund Freud’s Jokes [Witz] and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905; free eBook) – and the reactions to it. Still trying for clarity.

In this installment, I’m still addressing his second chapter, and his laundry list of joke techniques, which he is trying to narrow down to a few meta-types. We’ve moved on to the “Techniques of conceptual jokes,” which he says rely more on the situation for their humor.

Techniques of conceptual jokes

Freud characterizes these conceptual jokes as “mak[ing] use of deviations from normal thinking,” (42) and ultimately arrives at five categories: displacement, absurdity, faulty reasoning, unification, and indirect representation. Now up is faulty reasoning, with its two sub-sets, sophistical jokes and automatic extension.

Faulty reasoning

These have the “appearance of logic” about them, but are really “facades” for pieces of faulty reasoning (43).  Freud later calls a first sub-category of these “sophistical” pieces of faulty reasoning, or “sophistical” jokes (46). The key example, most often referenced, is the Kettle Joke.

  • Sophistical jokes: The kettle joke

A. borrowed a copper kettle from B. and after he had returned it was sued by B. because the kettle now had a big hole in it which made it unusable. His [A.’s] defence was:

“First, I never borrowed a kettle from B. at all; secondly, the kettle had a hole in it already when I got it from him; thirdly, I gave him back the kettle undamaged.”

Each one of these defences is valid in itself, but taken together they exclude one another. A. was treating in isolation what had to be regarded as connected whole…. We might also say: A. has put an “and” where only an “either-or” is possible (44).

Freud has another category, however, which he describes as “automatic.”

  • Automatic extension

Automatic jokes are when the faulty reasoning is an automatic extension of previously accepted norms or logic. Freud’s examples are pretty horrible, in cultural terms; here’s his second one:

The bridegroom was most disagreeably surprised when the bride was introduced to him, and drew the broker on one side and whispered his remonstrances: “Why have you brought me here?” he asked reproachfully. “She‘s ugly and old, she squints and has bad teeth and bleary eyes . . .”

“You needn‘t lower your voice”, interrupted the broker, “she‘s deaf as well.”

In each of his cases, Freud argues,

A person who has reacted in the same way several times in succession repeats this mode of expression on the next occasion, when it is unsuitable and defeats his own intentions. He neglects to adapt himself to the needs of the situation, by giving way to the automatic action of habit…. The broker in the second story is so much fascinated by the enumeration of the bride’s defects and infirmities that he completes the list out of his own knowledge, though that was certainly not his business or purpose…. In every case automatic action triumphs over the expedient modification of thought and expression. (46)

Summary

So faulty reasoning is another technique by which the joker makes use of deviations from normal thinking within the situation to achieve humor.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

Mo Amer’s Honest Truths

Corinna Burford of Paste Magazine (7/21/2017), talks about the recent surge in Mo Amer’s career, about his recent appearance on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (available on YouTube), and along the way says a few things that should interest us.

Dishonesty

Amer is “a Kuwait-born refugee of Palestinian descent in Houston, Texas,” which gives him an uncommon point of view. However, after 9/11/2001, he began to back away from those topics. As Burford tells it,

His tour to Japan, Korea and Bahrain was canceled. He worried about performing his set in local clubs, due to its personal nature and references to his culture. “I was scared,” he says. “For six months I just pretended to be Italian so I could let things blow over.”

This interests me because it speaks to the idea of a persona that isn’t based on the comic’s “True,” real life, which probably happens a lot more than most comics admit. Many comic’s intent is to go for a laugh, which drives them to say whatever will make that happen and avoid anything that impedes it.

Honesty

However, Amer eventually comes back to his roots.  Burford interprets it thusly,

But pretending became untenable. “I felt like I was losing myself,” he says. “Eventually I got so frustrated that I decided to go up at a comedy show and talk about who I was.” The experience was far from easy. “The audience went from laughter to complete shock,” he recalls, but eventually the crowd warmed up and he felt renewed worth in his more personal material. “You could feel that you were battling with these people’s emotions.”

I can completely relate to the feeling of frustration and “losing” yourself in the persona you think the audience wants you to be, and the urge to be something else.

However, the idea of “who I was” is problematic for me because it’s probably always a negotiation, if not, as Amer notes in his case “battle.”  You’re not being all of who you are, let alone all of who you could be, but the funniest part of you that the audience will accept with a laugh. And we have to make a choice to be the victim or the butt, to allow them to laugh with us or laugh at us. More recently, Amer is acting as the former.

Truth to power

More recently, Amer blew up the interwebs when he Instagrammed out a photo of himself seated next to Eric Trump with the caption:

Hey guys heading to Scotland to start the U.K. Tour and I am “randomly” chosen to sit next to non other than Eric Trump. Good news guys Muslims will not have to check in and get IDs. That’s what I was told. I will be asking him a lot of questions on this trip to Glasgow, Scotland. Sometimes God just sends you the material. #Merica #UKTour #HumanAppeal #ThisisNotAnEndorsement  #Trump2016ComedyTour

Burford notes,

CB: In hindsight, the run-in with Trump seems to have presaged a new phase in Amer’s career, one where he can finally speak truth to power on a larger scale than ever before.

MA: Now people look to me for commentary. What I’ve wanted from standup is to be able share my takes and ideas, and the Eric Trump thing has kind of fast-tracked that. It has given me platform that I’ve been wanting for a long time.

This idea of “speaking truth to power” is thus more Burford’s that Amer’s. Burford would make him as operating in a privileged, comic space where he is free to say what he pleases.

Amer’s view is more basic: simply “sharing my takes and ideas” on a particular stage or “platform.” He has no assumption that it’s Truth, that it’s reaching powerful people (other than, perhaps, the general audience) or that it will make an impact. It’s more that it’s his truths, which, as I described when talking about David Misch, are certain takes and ideas that fit with his persona to get a laugh.

While we know he’s trying to tell more of his story, he’s still gravitating towards the parts of his stories that he can make funny, that can get a laugh.  In his appearance on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, we laugh with him at Disneyland and Coke, who don’t include the most popular name in the world, Mohamed, in their campaigns, at soccer announcers who have to use it too much.  We laugh with him as he passes for Hispanic because he was forced to take E.S.L. We laugh with him at his 20 year citizenship process (already “extreme vetting”), and his passport woes in the meantime.

Summary

These are stories with some truth to them, in that they’re his takes on his experiences – they’re his truths. Through them, Amer says things about our culture and politics to audience members who always have the potential to become politically active, and he’s getting to say them on a national stage, so even more people are potentially activated. But this activation is more subtle, more insidious and, for me, more interesting.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

Michel Foucault on Prediscursives and the Discursive

Similar to de Saussure’s concept of signs, Michel Foucault claims that there are things that exist in the world – IRL – there are objects, bodies, events, practices, institutions, etc. These are prediscursive, existing outside of and perhaps prior to our talking about them or even our knowledge of them.

However, there’s also the discursive, the way we talk about these things. We interpret the prediscursive through the way that it is caught up in the discursive, which represents a whole vast cloud of knowledge and assumptions about characteristics, connections, relationships, etc. that Foucault calls a discourse formation.

It’s not that the prediscursive doesn’t matter outside of the discursive – it really does – but its complicated.  First off, ‘this prediscursive is still discursive,” that is to say, it signifies.  While it doesn’t “specify” how the object should be taken up and interpreted, it does serve to limit, to “characterize” and “define rules” (76).  In this way, the prediscursive elements are kind of like signifiers: we see a body that is marked by physical attributes, we see that this body is a certain size, we see that it has a particular skin color. These are real characteristics of bodies.

When we add the discursive on top of it, we get a set of signifieds that together create a sign; we begin to assign things meanings: those physical attributes mark her as a “woman.” That size of a woman is “heavyset,” or “big, fat.” That skin color is “black.”  Each of those interpretations comes along with a whole gang of other attributions – and taken collectively, they create more – about her lifestyle, her habits, her character, and why and how she’s funny.

More

To really blow your mind, the prediscursive exceeds the interpretation it’s given in any set of discourse formations. They say, “A picture is worth a thousand words,” that’s what we’re going for here.

When I try to describe an older photograph to you, you might agree that I did a better or worse job, but I will never capture all of it. Further, someone with a background in art or composition will see more than me. Someone with a background in photography may see more and different things. A historian would see different things.  With a great photograph, we could all sit around and talk for days and never express everything that the photo means, what it evokes in us.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

 

Foucault, Michel.  The Archaeology of Knowledge.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

de Saussure on Signifier – Signified – Signs

Structural Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure posited that any sign – any thing that is meaningful, a word, an emoji, a picture, etc. – can be broken into two parts: signifier and signified. The signifier is what we see or hear or experience.  The signified is what we think of, perceive or interpret. So when I see the letter “c” I think the sound I hear when someone says it, and visa versa; they come to signify each other.  Further, when I see a sequence, like “c-a-t,” I think – not just of the word “cat” – but about an idea of a cat, whatever that is in my mind: cats I’ve seen or encountered, purring, growling, biting, clawing, grumpy, etc.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977.

Kenneth Burke on Terministic Screens: Reflections – Selections – Deflections

As I said in a previous post, we have to realize, along with Kenneth Burke, that any discourse, any story, description or set of terms (“woman,” “heavyset,” “black,” etc.) must act as what Kenneth Burke calls a “terministic screen“–that it frames an issue. We should note the dual nature of screens: that they are both a surface upon which images can be projected, and also objects that block our view. Both these aspects come into play. The issue framed by a term is inevitably changed:

Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of reality. (45)

“A picture is worth a thousand words”–probably more like a million, and which thousand one chooses will never fully encapsulate everything that the picture is and can be. That’s the selection aspect. The deflection aspect is also important to note, because while we think we’re being shown all there is, what we see distracts us from the rest.  For instance, when comics play on their marginal personas and identities for a laugh, it fails to represent other things those comics could be, and further entrenches the expectations we have for all comics of that type.  These expectations, in turn may limit what we allow future comics who look like that to do.

Further, it’s not like we can escape this situation:

We must use terministic screens, since we can’t say anything without the use of terms (50).

The screens are a habit of symbolizing–in using symbols, we automatically create screens. The same is true of more complex symbols/screens, like identities and personas.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Burke, Kenneth (1966). “Terministic Screens.”  Language as Symbolic Action.  University of California: Berkeley, CA. 44-62.

Sigmund Freud’s Jokes part A. II. b. 2. The Techniques of Conceptual Jokes – Absurdity

This is the ninth of several installments on Sigmund Freud’s Jokes [Witz] and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905; free eBook) – and the reactions to it. Still trying for clarity.

In this installment, I’m still addressing his second chapter, and his laundry list of joke techniques, which he is trying to narrow down to a few meta-types. We’ve moved on to the “Techniques of conceptual jokes,” which he says rely more on the situation for their humor.

Techniques of conceptual jokes

Freud characterizes these conceptual jokes as “mak[ing] use of deviations from normal thinking,” (42) and ultimately arrives at five categories: displacement, absurdity, faulty reasoning, unification, and indirect representation. Now up is absurdity.

Absurdity

Freud classifies these as “jokes which… undisguisedly exhibit a piece of nonsense or stupidity” (39), sometimes to point out further absurdity, and sometimes not.

  • Pointing out further absurdity

One of his shorter examples here is as follows:

“Never to be born would be the best thing for mortal men.” “But,” adds the philosophical comment in Fliegende Blätter [trans. Flying leaves; A German satirical magazine], “this happens to scarcely one person in a hundred thousand.” (40)

Freud argues that the comment is nonsensical, the idea that “scarcely one person in a hundred thousand” is “never born” makes no sense. But it highlights the nonsense of the statement that preceded it: If you were never born, you wouldn’t be a mortal – you wouldn’t exist, or collectively, the category of “mortal men” wouldn’t exist. Freud thus concludes

The technique of the nonsensical joke which we have so far considered really consists, therefore, in presenting something that is stupid and nonsensical, the sense of which lies in the revelation and demonstration of something else that is stupid and nonsensical (41).

However, Freud also allows that it doesn’t always do this.

  • Without

Freud has a number of examples here as well, but here’s a short one: Lichtenberg’s joke where,

That’s dumb.

He wondered how it is that cats have two holes cut in their skin precisely at the place where their eyes are…. [Georg Christoph] Lichtenberg’s is a joke which makes use of stupidity for some purpose and behind which something lies.  But what? For the moment, we must admit, no answer can be given. (42)

Summary

So absurdity is another technique by which the joker makes use of deviations from normal thinking within the situation to achieve humor. Freud says sometimes they are enlightening, but sometimes not. However, I read the last example as a critique of creationists – it seems to be critiquing evolution by saying that they think it randomly happened that way, which is absurd, but ascribing an absurd argument to someone is a straw man fallacy, and those who make such allegations are the ones at fault, to it boomerangs.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

On Honest Personas, Signifieds, Truths and Spaces

Mo’Nique, in an interview with Blake Hannon of Kentucky.com (7/20/2017), had a few things to say about her past and present on-stage persona that are relevant to our discussions here.

Hannon notes,

Mo’Nique broke into comedy as a no-holds-barred, brutally honest champion of heavyset women when appearing on stage or on revered stand-up showcases like “Showtime at the Apollo,” HBO’s “Def Comedy Jam” or BET’s “Comic View.”

Late in the article, Hannon writes,

[A] stand-up comedy stage is the place you’ll most likely find her and find that even after all these years, she is evolving. She has learned to be more honest on stage, revealing both the sweet and the sour while spreading the laughs and the love in her own unique way.

Then we get a quote from Mo’Nique:

I think when I first started, it was I was a big, fat, black woman and that’s what I knew how to be funny with, and that was my honesty, but there was so much more to me than that. I tell people that, if you want to get to know me, come to a show. You truly walk away knowing exactly who I am, and you may find out who you are.

Honesty

In all three paragraphs, “honesty” is a key descriptor, she’s “a no-holds-barred, brutally honest champion of heavyset women,” which echoes Mo’Niques own statement that “I was a big, fat, black woman and that’s what I knew how to be funny with, and that was my honesty.” This seems straight-forward, a “heavyset,” black woman speaking her Truth.  However, there’s another part to this: that Mo’Nique is more than just a “heavyset,” black woman.

More honest

Hannon says, “She has learned to be more honest on stage,” which suggests that she wasn’t being completely honest before.  Yes, she has evolved into “more,” as we all do, but it’s also true that she was never just anything.

It’s that next part of Mo’Nique’s quote – that “but there was so much more to me than that,” the past tense – that should catch our attention. She always was more than that. The theory that I often think of here is Michel Foucault’s idea of the prediscursive. To get there, we have to backtrack a moment to a model of signs from Structural Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the basis of semiotics.

Signs

Saussure posited that any sign – any thing that is meaningful, a word, an emoji, a picture, etc. – can be broken into two parts: signifier and signified. The signifier is what we see or hear or experience.  The signified is what we think of, perceive or interpret. So when I see the letter “c” I think the sound I hear when someone says it, and visa versa; they come to signify each other.  Further, when I see a sequence, like “c-a-t,” I think – not just of the word “cat” – but about an idea of a cat, whatever that is in my mind: cats I’ve seen or encountered, purring, growling, biting, clawing, grumpy, etc.

Prediscursives and the discursive

Similarly, Foucault claims that there are things that exist in the world – IRL – there are objects, bodies, events, practices, institutions, etc. These are prediscursive, existing outside of and perhaps prior to our talking about them or even our knowledge of them.

However, there’s also the discursive, the way we talk about these things. We interpret the prediscursive through the way that it is caught up in the discursive, which represents a whole vast cloud of knowledge and assumptions about characteristics, connections, relationships, etc. that Foucault calls a discourse formation.

It’s not that the prediscursive doesn’t matter outside of the discursive – it really does – but its complicated.  First off, ‘this prediscursive is still discursive,” that is to say, it signifies.  While it doesn’t “specify” how the object should be taken up and interpreted, it does serve to limit, to “characterize” and “define rules” (76).  In this way, the prediscursive elements are kind of like signifiers: we see a body that is marked by physical attributes, we see that this body is a certain size, we see that it has a particular skin color. These are real characteristics of bodies.

When we add the discursive on top of it, we get a set of signifieds that together create a sign; we begin to assign things meanings: those physical attributes mark her as a “woman.” That size of a woman is “heavyset,” or “big, fat.” That skin color is “black.”  Each of those interpretations comes along with a whole gang of other attributions – and taken collectively, they create more – about her lifestyle, her habits, her character, and why and how she’s funny.

More

To really blow your mind, the prediscursive exceeds the interpretation it’s given in any set of discourse formations. They say, “A picture is worth a thousand words,” that’s what we’re going for here.

When I try to describe an older photograph to you, you might agree that I did a better or worse job, but I will never capture all of it. Further, someone with a background in art or composition will see more than me. Someone with a background in photography may see more and different things. A historian would see different things.  With a great photograph, we could all sit around and talk for days and never express everything that the photo means, what it evokes in us.

That’s a single picture; a snapshot of time. How much more complex is a person?

More human

In an interview with Tre’Vell Anderson of the Los Angeles Times (7/20/2017), Zainab Johnson expresses a more fleshed-out view on this topic.  Anderson notes that she “battles expectations of what she and her set … should be.”

I had a shaved head and I wore my hair in an afro a lot, so people expect the strong black woman thing. But I love to say some ratchet …, just so that you understand that nothing — not my hair, not my look, not one particular joke — defines me. I’m a person in the world, and so the way that I approach stand-up is I tell my story.

Sometimes my story involves the fact that I’m a woman and sometimes it involves the fact that I’m a black woman. Sometimes it involves the fact that I’m from a big family and sometimes it involves the fact that I have body issues. It encompasses so many things that it’s just the human that I am, and I hate to say this in interviews… but it is what it is. You either … with me or you don’t.

I like this quote in comparison to Mo’Niques because it clearly displays a realization that she’s telling many parts to a larger story, and that the story has so many facets that she may never adequately cover it, they’re all just “selections.”

Reflections – Selections – Deflections

As I said in a previous post, we have to realize, along with Kenneth Burke, that any discourse, any story, description or set of terms (“woman,” “heavyset,” “black,” etc.) must act as what Kenneth Burke calls a “terministic screen” – that it frames an issue. The issue so framed is inevitably changed:

Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of reality. (45)

This deflection is important to note, because while we think we’re being shown all there is, it distracts us from the rest.  When comics play on their marginal personas and identities for a laugh, it further entrenches the expectations we have for all comics of that type.  These expectations, in turn may limit what we allow those comics to do.  This comes from another selection and deflection, brought about by under-representation.

There aren’t as many women – and especially black women – in comedy as there are men, so the few there are stand out more.  Johnson makes this point as well, stating that while male comics talk about their bodies or complain about the opposite sex,

But the thing about it is you get to see 100 of those, and so they don’t stand out to you. You don’t see very many women. So, if I tell you I saw three women and 100 men [when I booked shows], I’m gonna remember the three women, because they came few and far between, so they stood out to me. And if those women weren’t good to me, I’m gonna remember that and I’m gonna assign that to the entire gender — which is ridiculous.

In an interview with The New York Times (7/12/2017), Jenny Slate expresses a similar problem when asked by Ana Marie Cox:

AMC: You’re often grouped with actresses like Abbi Jacobson and Ilana Glazer of Broad City, and Lena Dunham. Does that feel accurate?

JS: It’s lovely to be put into that group with these women. I also don’t think that we’re very similar other than that we’re women and we all have vaginas and we don’t seem to be very scared of that. It’s annoying to be oversimplified.

The selection of women we’re presented with is deflected to stand in for all women. So, similarly, fat comics stand in for all fat people, black comics for all black people, etc. These expectations create implicit rules for how we approach the space of stand-up.

More spaces

In that same article by Tre’Vell Anderson of the Los Angeles Times (7/20/2017), Amanda Seales talks about how she feels limited by race, sex and gender expectations, and how she’s trying to expand the space:

AS: My whole intention is to break down these limitations of what a black comedian is supposed to be and to open up a space. For a lot of comics who aren’t as silly or physical, but more intellectual, we get looked at as ‘alt comics. No, I’m still a black comic and there are black people who want to hear my type of black comedy, but that space hasn’t been built out for us.

AS: In the white comedy world, there are all different kinds. With us, you’re either ‘Def Comedy’ or [nothing].

TA: And Seales’ “head-y” style of comedy is making room for different types of funny black women.

AS: I think [my peers and I] are ushering in a type of comedy that’s not just [about] sex and relationships but also sinking our teeth into political and social issues in a way that black women haven’t really been lauded for in the past.

TA: Most of the time, black female comedians are expected to talk about their vaginas, she adds, using a word other than vaginas.

AS: My comedy is different in that it’s rooted in social commentary.

I don’t know which is worse, the idea of “black comedy” as a particular type (silly, physical) or set of topics (genitalia, sex and relationships), or the idea that it’s the only type of comedy that “black comics” can do. Certainly complicated human beings should have a bit more leeway to comment on their human experience.

Summary

So no, Mo’Nique wasn’t telling us her Truth, and now she’s evolved.  She knows she was always more, as does Johnson.

Before, Mo’Nique was merely telling us a part of her truth, a few of her many truths (in the postmodern sense I’ve discussed previously) because “that’s what [she] knew how to be funny with.” She created a persona, one based on a marginalized identity that was only one part of her complex life and personality.

Now she knows how to make more of her life funny, so like Johnson she’s telling more, but they’re both still using “slippery personas.” Their new personas may be more like their real life self (whatever that is), but it’s still a selection, still a deflection.

So no, we’re not going to “truly walk away knowing exactly who [Mo’Nique is],” and we probably won’t “find out who [we] are,” just parts and pieces.  I’d like to think we’re all more. For that reason, we may never be fully “with” Johnson, though we can laugh and enjoy the parts we get.

And perhaps by comics like Seales choosing to do more, we can open the door for other, different personas to emerge, expanding the pie (range of pies?) for comics and audiences alike. That sounds worthwhile. Who doesn’t want more pie?

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Burke, Kenneth. “Terministic Screens.”  Language as Symbolic Action.  44-62.

de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977.

Foucault, Michel.  The Archaeology of Knowledge.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

Sigmund Freud’s Jokes part A. II. b. 1. The Techniques of Conceptual Jokes – Displacement

This is the eighth of several installments on Sigmund Freud’s Jokes [Witz] and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905; free eBook) – and the reactions to it. Still trying for clarity.

In this installment, I’m still addressing his second chapter, and his laundry list of joke techniques, which he is trying to narrow down to a few meta-types. We’ve already addressed all of his “Techniques of verbal jokes,” so now I move on to the “Techniques of conceptual jokes,” which he says rely more on the situation.

Techniques of conceptual jokes

Freud says, “But there really are jokes whose technique resists almost any attempt to connect it with the groups that have so far been considered” (i.e. verbal jokes; 33). He later characterizes these conceptual jokes as “mak[ing] use of deviations from normal thinking,” (42) and gives us three categories:

Faulty reasoning,” “Unification,” “Indirect Representation” – these, then, are the headings under which we can classify those techniques of conceptual jokes” (59).

However, later he seems to remember that he had five:

This is equally true, however, of the techniques of conceptual jokes – displacement, faulty reasoning, absurdity, indirect representation, representation by the opposite – which re-appear one and all in the technique of the dream-work. (65)

Where did unification go? Representation by the opposite was just a subset of unification.  Nevertheless, over the next several days I will address each of the five in the order that Freud covers them, breaking them up with some larger points he makes along the way: displacement, absurdity, faulty reasoning, unification, and indirect representation.  First up is displacement.

Displacement

Freud returns to a joke he mentioned previously.

Two Jews met in the neighborhood of the bath-house. “Have you taken a bath?” asked one of them. “What?” asked the other in return, “Is there one missing?” (34)

In the bath house joke (and others) Freud finds that the technique being used is to “divert” or “displace” the emphasis or “accent” of the question (“bathed”) to a different one (“taken/stolen a bath”).

I propose to describe it as ‘displacement,’ since its essence lies in the diversion of the train of thought, the displacement of the psychological emphasis on to a topic other than the opening one” (36).

It is in this technique the Freud’s theory most overlaps with Incongruity Theory, as we’ve described it previously. It’s classic misdirection, creating surprise.

Displacement habitually takes place between a remark and a reply which pursues the train of thought in a direction other than that in which it was started by the original remark. (38)

Summary

So displacement is the first of several techniques by which the joker makes use of deviations from normal thinking within the situation to achieve humor.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

Update to Persona

Added the following bit from an interview with John Sheehan.

John Sheehan expresses the idea that who he is onstage is a heightened or more extreme version of himself in an interview with Heather Barrett of CBCnews.com (7/23/2017):

When it’s stand-up [when he’s performing stand-up], it’s me, it’s my thoughts, it’s my character, it’s me with the volume turned up.

Although he says “it’s me, it’s my thoughts,” the idea of “my character” starts to twist things – does he mean character as in the mental and moral qualities distinctive to him, or the fictional person he’s created?  In any case, the next bit – “it’s me with the volume turned up” – suggests that he’s moved at least in part to the latter.

Rory Scovel on Connecting to Smart Audiences

In an interview with Oxford American’s Jacob Rosenberg (7/18/2017), Rory Scovel talks a bit about his relation to the audience in some ways that are important, casting them as participants in his act, as smart, thinking people, with whom he has to connect.

On audience roles

Scovel does a lot of spontaneous stuff, sometimes performing a character, like the “Southern Bro” he trots out in what I’ve called his “Lenny Bruce Opening” to his Netflix special, Rory Scovel Tries Stand-Up for the First Time. He is asked by Rosenberg,

Sometimes you’re in the middle of your set in that character, but it seems like you’re still listening and judging what you are saying. Then you pop out some perfect line that coalesces the whole joke, makes fun of what you said before even. Are you doing a lot of listening to yourself ramble?

It’s a weird balance of listening to yourself, so you can kind of be driving the car, but also listening to the audience so you can also see the road. Whenever I have a bad set it’s usually because I’m not doing one of those things at all. I’m either not paying attention to the crowd or I was over-confident with what I was going to do. Whenever there’s a night where I’m dialed in and I have the most fun, it’s usually because I’m right fifty-fifty on listening to the crowd and myself.

What I find interesting in this driving metaphor, first off, because how frequently are any of us active and self-conscious when driving? My ideal driving is kind of a zen zone-out where everything just comes together because of years of driving that car, on that road, in similar conditions.

Nevertheless, the idea that he’s actively listening to the audience as much as he’s thinking about what he’s saying is admirable.  It indicates that Scovel might view his audience – in terms of the popular ideas about audiences I’ve talked about before – at least as directors, in that he responds to them, so in a sense, they direct him, or maybe as lovers, equal partners in the creation of the comedy event.

Smart audiences

Scovel further expresses the uncommon idea about audiences that they are (or can be) thinking human beings:

Do you ever struggle to find that connection with a crowd?

If you came and saw me live tomorrow, 100% of people definitely aren’t laughing 100% of the time. Sometimes it’s these twenty people, then it’s fifty, then it’s eighty; then it’s only five. I think a smart audience is an audience that realizes they shouldn’t laugh at everything. It’s kind of absurd to think, when you go to a concert, you have to leave going: “I loved every moment. I loved everything.” It’s kind of ridiculous that everything has to be perfect and cater to what I enjoy.

A common interpretation of laughter is that it’s an unconscious, emotional reaction to something that stands in for any other type of action – once we laugh, we’ve unconsciously agreed to take no further action, we’ve agreed that this is play and the topic or joke was trivial.

While we could read this as Scovel doing a little C.Y.A. as to why people don’t laugh at his jokes – “I swear, it’s not that the jokes are bad, it’s that audiences are so smart.” Instead, Scovel seems to join those who argue that humor is (or can be) a more active, conscious, rational process – this is why it’s possible to feign laughter to fit in.  Scovel’s audience seems to engage with his material and decide to laugh – or not – which is why he must listen to them.

On connecting

In his next answer, Scovel leans more toward viewing his audience as lovers, and also says something about the authenticity of his persona.

How do you try to stay in the moment—and stay silly—while you’re actually doing comedy?

I think just reminding myself to quit thinking that there’s some kind of perfect show to capture; to remind myself constantly that it is comedy and mistakes are funny. Anything that is too perfect—it kind of becomes too sterile and then it does not feel genuine. If it doesn’t feel genuine then there’s no possible way people are going to feel they saw you.

This idea of the audience “feel[ing] they saw you” strikes me as reminiscent of James Cameron’s Avatar, where the “I see you” greeting is parallel to the Sanskrit Namaste, and implies that they see deeply, they see the real, True you – or at least, they feel that way.  Scovel implies that the audience has to be convinced that this is happening.  This really only fits into a relational, lover model of audiences (under my current working hypothesis); in terms of the model, they have to be wooed. However, this wooing does not have to be authentic, Scovel still leaves some wiggle room for a persona.

Scovel is trying to create an imperfect show, because he wants it to “feel genuine.” He seems to agree with David Misch that jokes don’t have to be truthful, but truth-adjacent; they have to be believable. This means that he doesn’t have to speak 100% truth, but just enough that it “feels” right.  In Misch’s terms, Scovel (when not doing a character), is using a “slippery persona” that seems very much like himself IRL, or at least, so far as we know.

Summary

Yes, I read between the lines and infer a lot – it’s kind of my thing.  Scovel says he listens to them, which means for him they’re active participants.  He says smart audiences don’t laugh at everything, which I interpret as saying he thinks they are thinking during his show. He talks about making a show “feel genuine” so the audience “feel they saw [him],” which I read as saying that he’s trying to create a relationship with the audience, though he realizes it can be based on a “slippery” version of him. Taken this way, Scovel’s view of the audience and his relation to them is somewhat more evolved than most that I’ve seen.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?