Update to Political, Social and Entertainment Comedians

Just to keep everyone abreast of the updates I make to the site, I decided I should announce them in separate posts, under Ramblings.

This update is to the post previously titled Social and Entertainment Comedians, which I always knew would need to be expanded.  Here’s the new bit:

Social vs. political

This isn’t the only way to cut it, some make the distinction between social and political. In an interview with Neal Conan on National Public Radio, Lewis Black describes himself as a ‘social’ (or perhaps ‘topical’) comic, not a political comic, because he draws material from whatever is in the news that excites him, from Superbowl half-time performances to the weather.

Hip hop

In an interview with Rolling Stone’s Jesse Serwer about his 2017 Netflix special (7/1/2017), They Can’t Deport Us All, rapper turned comic Chingo Bling talks about his stance on immigration:

A lot of comedians have bits about growing up Mexican, but I feel like [immigration] is one of those things where people think they might hurt endorsements or it might make them seem too political if they talk about it. People are scared to touch it. I like to consider myself a hip-hop comic, somebody that is going to say something of substance. And that’s what I’m working towards.

Summary

Any way you slice it, as Mike Acker of oregonlive.com notes in an interview with Solomon Georgio (7/3/2017) about his upcoming special: “Conscious comedy is on the rise, whether it’s overtly political or social commentary.”

Problems with Satiric Irony

I’m still talking about Bill Maher’s 2007 HBO stand-up showcase, Bill Maher: The Decider, where, after greeting the Boston crowd, Maher begins with a critique of President George W. Bush.  Only 50 seconds later, he comes to this nugget:

The country has fuck-up fatigue.  [Laughter]  Which is what happens when the guy [George W. Bush] fucks up so much that when he fucks up again, people go [Resignedly]  “Well, what do you expect. [Laughter]  He’s a fuck-up.”  And that’s fucked up!  [Laughter]

He has now convinced himself that history will be kind to him.  [Sarcastically]  It’s just US, in the PRESENT who don’t get it.  [Laughing to himself].  He’s the Van Gogh of Presidents, you know, not appreciated in THIS lifetime but…

I swear to god a couple of weeks ago he was defending his legacy and he said [in imitation of George W. Bush], “They’re still debating our first President.”  No they’re not.  Who’s debating whether George Washington was a good President?  He’s on the one.  [Laughter]  He’s on Mount Rushmore. [Laughing himself]  They named the capitol after him – I think the jury is in on this guy.  I do.  [Laughter and applause]

Stanley Fish’s critique of Booth

As I’ve mentioned earlier, Booth talks about stable ironies easily understood (or “gotten”) by a “reasonable,” “qualified reader” as opposed to unstable ironies that could mean a number of things, and also local ironies, where one must possess specific knowledge as opposed to infinite ironies, which anyone could potentially “get.” Stanley Fish disputes this characterization on the grounds that these binary oppositions – stable/unstable, local/infinite – quickly break down in real life.

First off, who is this “reasonable,” “qualified reader” who can easily decide what the stable, intended meaning is? Is such a reader ever guaranteed? Shouldn’t we bank on the idea that all ironies are potentially unstable? But at the same time, how unstable can they be? Specific people in specific places and times will understand the joke and author in a specific way.

These interpretations, what I call the uptake of the joke, how the joke is taken up by actual people, help ground or fix the number of possible interpretations of the ironic joke. Ultimately, however, I would add that the potential meaning of any joke is fixed by the text of the joke itself – not its audience or context, both of which will change over time; however, in any context with any audience, there are only so many possible interpretations.

Further, the differentiation between local and infinite irony has at its heart an idea that some things require specific information, and other things everyone knows, a concept that is problematic for many cultural scholars. Is there an infinite irony that crosses all borders, languages, ethnic groups and religions? Probably not; to some extent, all irony is probably local.  At the same time, can’t any local example be taken up to display broader, universal themes? Probably, if thought about in a particular way.

If, as Colebrook says, irony since Socrates “is the resistance to a single fixed point of view” (80), then it cannot be truly stable and limited.  However, it must be capable of being understood from particular points of view, so it cannot be truly unstable or infinite.  It must be anchored to be meaningful, but expansive to be ironical.

Unreliable strategies

Lisa Gring-Pemble and Martha Solomon Watson believe the rhetoric of verbal irony as a discrepancy between two (or more) possible meanings, when used for satire is self-defeating.  Using Booth’s model to examine satiric irony, these scholars note that it is more likely for different audiences to reach quite different conclusions about the text and still be amused.  In this sense, these texts are polyvalent, affording one the opportunity to apply different values and thus choose the object of the humor.  Thus Gring-Pemble and Watson find that satiric irony is an ineffective rhetorical strategy because “the audience can laugh at the humorous elements in the ironic discourse but reject the disparagement that is its goal” (138).

Other reasons to laugh

For instance, though we may recognize Maher’s attempt to ridicule the President, we can laugh at his “dick joke”: the repeated use of the work “fuck” and the reference to the President as a “fuck-up.”  This is classic Relief theory, though we could also feel Superior to those who are “fuck ups.” We could also find its usage unexpected and therefore Incongruous.

We also can laugh at Maher’s wit evidenced by the reference to Van Gogh – it’s a novel connection, kind of artsy and nerdy, and we weren’t expecting it.  Thus Incongruity theory more squarely enters the discussion.

We may just laugh at Maher’s impersonation of Bush, which some might think is a fairly accurate caricature. Or we may laugh because we think the caricature is hyperbolic and untrue, it’s a reductio ad absurdum. In both of these we might find more Incongruity, and perhaps more Superiority.

Or we may find the President’s own favorable comparison of himself to George Washington laughable (even if we like Bush) – and this is not to say that a comparison with a more modestly influential president is not warranted. Here we could link in all three theories.

Or perhaps we can note how Maher structured the argument to be parallel to the old “borrowed kettle” joke that Freud and Zizek reference, thus casting Bush as a laughable figure who uses contradictory arguments.

Kettle logic

Briefly, when confronted with having borrowed and damaged a kettle, the borrower responds:

  1. Either I never borrowed a kettle, or
  2. I returned it to you unbroken, or
  3. The kettle was damaged when I borrowed it.

The humor stems from the fact that in trying to cover all his bases, the borrower’s arguments negate one another – you said you never borrowed it, now you’re saying you did, and why would you borrow a broken kettle? It makes no sense.  This form of humor is sometimes referred to as literary irony (Mueke).

As Maher would have it, Bush’s logic runs thusly:

  1. Either I am not a fuck-up (or not thought to be a fuck-up), or
  2. History will prove that I was not a fuck-up (those in the future will not think I was a fuck-up), or
  3. Even great presidents are forever thought by some to be fuck-ups (I will always be thought by some to be a fuck-up).

In casting Bush in this way, Maher reduces Bush’s arguments to an absurd level (another reductio ad absurdum), and we can derive humor from the wit of this reduction (not just from a reduced Bush).  This also allows fans of Bush an “out,” in that it does not rule out arguments whereby Bush can escape the title of “fuck-up.” Maher isn’t covering all possible arguments, just the ones that support his point, and that may not convince the unconvinced.

Summary

What these various readings display is that readers don’t have to treat a text as stable, though it never becomes completely unstable.  To a certain extent, they can apply local knowledge or expand their understanding to larger contexts, and they can find (or fail to find) humor in a number of different places, even if they “get” the satirical intent.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Booth, Wayne C.  The Rhetoric of Irony.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1975.

Ceccarelli, Leah.  “Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism.”  Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 395-415.

Colebrook, Claire. Irony. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Fish, Stanley. “Short People Got No Reason to Live: Reading Irony.” Daedalus, 112, 1998: 175-191.

Gilbert, Joanne.  Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender and Cultural Critique. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, 2004.

Gournelos, Ted. “Irony, Community, and the Intelligent Design Debate in South Park and The Simpsons.” Electronic Journal of Communication, 18 (2, 3 & 4), 2008: 1-18.

Gring-Pemble, Lisa and Martha Solomon Watson.  “The Rhetorical Limits of Satire: An Analysis of James Finn Garner’s Politically Correct Bedtime Stories.”  Quarterly Journal of Speech 89.2 (2003): 132-53.

Maher, Bill. Bill Maher: The Decider.  Original air date 21 July, 2007.  New York: Home Box Office.  Available (in 8 parts).  Retrieved 30 December, 2007.

Mueke, D. C.  The Compass of Irony. London: Methuen and Company LTD., 1969.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny? A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Satiric Irony and Litige

To continue with Bill Maher’s 2007 HBO stand-up showcase, Bill Maher: The Decider, I’ve indicated the part after he greets the Boston crowd, where Maher begins with a critique of President George W. Bush.  Only 50 seconds later, he comes to this nugget:

The country has fuck-up fatigue.  [Laughter]  Which is what happens when the guy [George W. Bush] fucks up so much that when he fucks up again, people go [Resignedly]  “Well, what do you expect. [Laughter]  He’s a fuck-up.”  And that’s fucked up!  [Laughter]

He has now convinced himself that history will be kind to him.  [Sarcastically]  It’s just US, in the PRESENT who don’t get it.  [Laughing to himself].  He’s the Van Gogh of Presidents, you know, not appreciated in THIS lifetime but…

I swear to god a couple of weeks ago he was defending his legacy and he said [in imitation of George W. Bush], “They’re still debating our first President.”  No they’re not.  Who’s debating whether George Washington was a good President?  He’s on the one.  [Laughter]  He’s on Mount Rushmore. [Laughing himself]  They named the capitol after him – I think the jury is in on this guy.  I do.  [Laughter and applause]

Tearing this bit apart using Wayne Booth’s model of verbal irony, we can see that in his second point, Maher uses irony satirically (in the form of sarcasm): that history will be kind to President Bush.

He states – with the President – that we don’t “get it,” comparing Bush to Van Gogh, a great artist who was unappreciated (and thought crazy by some) in his own time, but who, via his works, attained immortality. He signals his ironic intention in the set up, but also through emphasis on specific words (e.g. “It’s just US, in the PRESENT who don’t get it… [Bush is] not appreciated in THIS lifetime”) and through his own laughter at the statements while stating them. Thus Maher seems to be effective in both stating one thing and signaling that it means something else, and the end result is to make Bush look ridiculous, as I’ve indicated.

Litige

However, the problem with this interpretation is that it presupposes that dispute resolution will take place via litigation or litige, “a dispute where both parties articulate their claims in a language they mutually share with a court or judge whose legitimacy they both recognize,” in which “the decorum of the court is known and respected by both parties, and the judgment imposes closure” (Charland, 221-22).

This tradition of litige is commonly inferred whenever we talk, including when we tell jokes.  Generally, we think that everyone communicates like we do, and therefore, everyone knows exactly what a person means when they say something, either because of the words they’ve chosen or the way they say it – we know how they’re supposed to act, the decorum, and therefore we can all judge the way they did act.

If only it were that simple.

Above, Charland’s description requires shared language, shared decorum and a shared estimation of and respect for authority. These elements of litige are fairly well recognized as requirements in not only satire, but basic conceptions of irony as well. Ettema and Glasser admit that for the journalist’s sense of outrage to shine through when using irony, the writer and reader must share a particular moral frame and vocabulary. Booth argues that irony requires a tremendous amount of shared meaning and the fact that a shared sense of irony can occur at all is astonishing. These authors seem to recognize that for irony to be received, all involved must engage in the logic of litige.

In this case, Maher seems to be stating his case in transparent language, which he expects to evoke the proper meaning and therefore judgment from the audience. However, [as I’ll describe soon,] we can’t easily rely on litige when we’re trying to both move people politically, and at the same time say something funny. A particular problem for comics is authorial intent – that they are speaking plainly and mean what they say; that they are bona fide – when we know that they’re supposed to be just joking. But strangely, even if we grant that they mean what they say, it does not ensure the message will have any effect. The process of irony itself can affect the reception and clarity of the message. We might read Maher’s satire as ironic [as I’ll describe tomorrow].

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Booth, Wayne C.  The Rhetoric of Irony.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1975.

Charland, Maurice.  “Property and Propriety: Rhetoric, Justice, and Lyotard’s Différend.”  Judgment Calls: Rhetoric, Politics, and Indeterminancy.  Ed. John M. Sloop and James P. McDaniel.  Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998. 220-36.

Ettema, James S. and Theodore L. Glasser. Custodians of Conscience: Investigative Journalism and Public Virtue.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. 1905. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1963.

Lyotard, Jean François.  The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.  Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1984/2002.

—.  The Différend.  Trans. George Van Den Abeele.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1988.

—.  “Lessons in Paganism.”  The Lyotard Reader.  Ed. Andrew Benjamin.  Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989/1993. 122-154.

Maher, Bill. Bill Maher: The Decider.  Original air date 21 July, 2007.  New York: Home Box Office.  Available (in 8 parts).  Retrieved 30 December, 2007.

Mueke, D. C.  The Compass of Irony. London: Methuen and Company LTD., 1969.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny? A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Satire (and Litige)

In his 2007 HBO stand-up showcase, Bill Maher: The Decider, after greeting the Boston crowd, Maher begins with a critique of President George W. Bush.  Only 50 seconds later, he comes to this nugget:

The country has fuck-up fatigue.  [Laughter]  Which is what happens when the guy [George W. Bush] fucks up so much that when he fucks up again, people go [Resignedly]  “Well, what do you expect. [Laughter]  He’s a fuck-up.”  And that’s fucked up!  [Laughter]

He has now convinced himself that history will be kind to him.  [Sarcastically]  It’s just US, in the PRESENT who don’t get it.  [Laughing to himself].  He’s the Van Gogh of Presidents, you know, not appreciated in THIS lifetime but…

I swear to god a couple of weeks ago he was defending his legacy and he said [in imitation of George W. Bush], “They’re still debating our first President.”  No they’re not.  Who’s debating whether George Washington was a good President?  He’s on the one.  [Laughter]  He’s on Mount Rushmore. [Laughing himself]  They named the capitol after him – I think the jury is in on this guy.  I do.  [Laughter and applause]

[I’ll use this example for the next couple of days, as it is good for making a couple of key points.] This is clearly an attempt at satire, defined as a directed effort to correct, censure or ridicule, to bring about contempt or derision and therefore to enforce the status quo (Cuddon; Gring-Pemble and Watson; Morner and Rausch).

Moreover, as Brian Raftery of Wired.com (11/11/2016) states,

The most effective political satire doesn’t merely affirm our viewpoints; instead, it digs into *why* we feel the way we do, and lets it loose our frustrations at a volume we’re either too cowed or confused to muster on our own.

Satire is thus marked by a teleological (or end) goal that its cousins, irony and parody, may lack–it’s supposed to enforce the status quo.  Because satire has a goal other than humor, it is considered the most politically active of the humorous forms.  Because of its connection to ridicule, contempt and derision, it is intimately linked to theories of superiority, especially in its classic, system maintenance function.

Maher is pretty clear in his conviction that the President doesn’t just make mistakes, but is characterized by making mistakes; that he is less competent than we, the audience, should expect him to be.  Maher is also clear in indicating that this assessment is not blinded by proximity; it’s not that we are just too close to the historical moment to appreciate W.  Further, it’s not that all presidents are controversial figures, debated for all time.  The jury is in on George Washington, and it may also be in on George W.

Taken together, these humorous arguments seem to ridicule Bush in order to bring about our derision, ultimately aimed at returning us to a state of common sense when choosing our next leader. Maybe it worked and we got Obama.

Litige

However, the urge to determine the exact meaning, as I’ve done above, stem from what Jean-François Lyotard calls rhetoric’s republican roots–as coming from the citizens in the Republic, as opposed to the pagans outside of it.  This republican system presupposes that dispute resolution will take place via litigation or litige (“Lessons”). Maurice Charland describes litige as “a dispute where both parties articulate their claims in a language they mutually share with a court or judge whose legitimacy they both recognize,” in which “the decorum of the court is known and respected by both parties, and the judgment imposes closure” (221-22). We have to share a perspective with Maher, and recognize his language as critique.

Other possibilities

However, as Gring-Pemble and Watson point out, humorous satirical texts often include other forms of humor; therefore “getting” (let alone agreeing with) the satire is not necessary to finding humor.  Perhaps most notably, we can also read the text ironically.

Satire is sometimes thought to be a subset of verbal irony and sometimes the superior term.  The distinction is problematic because one can employ irony for satiric ends, yet this is not the full scope of irony; however, one can also employ satire ironically, that is to say, speak satirically while meaning something different [I’ll have more to say on each of these in the coming days].  Such distinctions between satiric irony and ironic satire at some point become moot to the extent that they are always potentially present and yet never guaranteed uptake by any particular audience.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Charland, Maurice.  “Property and Propriety: Rhetoric, Justice, and Lyotard’s Différend.”  Judgment Calls: Rhetoric, Politics, and Indeterminancy.  Ed. John M. Sloop and James P. McDaniel.  Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998. 220-36.

Cuddon, J.A.  A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory.  4th ed.  Rev. C.E.  Preston.  Williston, VT: Blackwell, 1998.

Gring-Pemble, Lisa and Martha Solomon Watson.  “The Rhetorical Limits of Satire: An Analysis of James Finn Garner’s Politically Correct Bedtime Stories.”  Quarterly Journal of Speech 89.2 (2003): 132-53.

Lyotard, Jean François.  The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.  Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1984/2002.

—.  The Différend.  Trans. George Van Den Abeele.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1988.

—.  “Lessons in Paganism.”  The Lyotard Reader.  Ed. Andrew Benjamin.  Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989/1993. 122-154.

Maher, Bill. Bill Maher: The Decider.  Original air date 21 July, 2007.  New York: Home Box Office.  Available (in 8 parts).  Retrieved 30 December, 2007.

Morner, Kathleen and Ralph Rausch.  “Satire.”  Dictionary of Literary Terms.  Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook Company, 1991. 194.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny? A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Irony: Traditional Verbal Irony

Irony has been studied since at least Classical Greece.  There are a few different types of irony, including dramatic irony, where the words or actions of the characters are clear to the audience, though unknown to the characters themselves. Particularly important for us is the concept of verbal irony.

Verbal Irony

The Oxford English Dictionary defines verbal irony as “A figure of speech in which the intended meaning is the opposite of that expressed by the words used”; thus we note in irony a discrepancy or gap between two (or more) possible meanings that vie for audience acceptance:

  1. the stated and
  2. the (potentially) intended.

Based off this definition, many scholars put irony and parody under the umbrella of Incongruity theory – because the stated cannot be taken at face value, there is a paradox.  However, fans of the Tension Relief theory argue that the stated creates tension, which the act of “getting it” releases.  And then, of course, fans of Superiority theory will argue that “getting it” makes us feel better than those who don’t. And maybe all of these can be true simultaneously.

Opposite meanings

It is the idea that the two meanings are “opposites” that causes problems.  If one meaning is opposite another, then the two meanings are usually thought to be mutually exclusive and therefore – if it is to serve a persuasive purpose – the intended meaning negates the stated meaning.

Political tools

We know that irony does not need to have any deep political import or satiric intent; however, some scholars, including those who study rhetoric (from Socrates and Quintilian through Wayne Booth, and beyond), focus on serious intention and thus characterize verbal irony, along with its cousins satire and parody, as political tools (see for instance Muecke and Booth).

Inserting outrage

It is in this vein that James Ettema and Theodore Glasser argue that for journalists, irony is merely a way to insert their outrage (easily visible to the discerning reader) into their reporting, while seeming to maintain the convention of objectivity.

However, outrage and criticism need not evoke humor.  As we can see, the conventions of humor – like the comic’s intention to make people laugh first and foremost, which John Limon argues means that in its absolute form, stand-up is never political – create problems for the application of this simple, oppositional model of verbal irony to stand-up comedy.

Wayne Booth’s Irony

Wayne Booth comes to the conclusion that there are four steps that an audience member must complete in lock-step with the ironist for irony to be received – for us to “get it”:

  1. They must reject the literal meaning
  2. They must try out alternative interpretations, none of which seem to fit
  3. They must make a decision as to the author’s intended meaning, and
  4. They must choose which meaning to accept.

The ironist thus has two rhetorical goals:

  1. To create a complete, coherent text, and
  2. To somehow signal to the audience (or a portion thereof) that the first text is untrue or the opposite of that which is intended and thus settle the contradiction (Freud).

Booth describes irony in terms of two binary relations: stable/unstable and local/infinite. In stable ironic texts, the alternative interpretation is clear to a “reasonable,” “qualified reader” (Gournelos, 2). Unstable irony, on the other hand, is less clear; clearly the literal meaning must be rejected, but multiple interpretations are possible. Local irony deals with specific events, places and times, whereas infinite irony deals with subjects that span space and time, such as life or the world in general.

For Booth, the best (most rhetorical, political or pragmatic) irony helps its reader to a stable conclusion the rhetor actually intends, while maintaining some plausible deniability of this intention, at least for a time.  This deniability is essential as it creates the space where such a critique can be made.

Claire Colebrook has further suggested that all language is ironic as it is potentially unstable.  [This is a concept I will discuss soon.]  It’s not just that we can take any statement as a joke – we can guffaw, or laugh it off – but that we can take any statement as ironical, as having a different meaning that the one stated. This is the benefit of studying humor, as it reveals the limits and possibilities of all communication.

However, deniability also creates new problems.  While irony can be employed to further satire, what we will call satiric irony, the satirist may also invite a reading as ironic, performing, in a sense, ironic satire.  [I’ll talk about each of these soon.]  Both of these readings pose problems for the bona fide political speaker.

Comments? Questions? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Booth, Wayne C.  The Rhetoric of Irony.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1975.

Colebrook, Claire. Irony. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Ettema, James S. and Theodore L. Glasser. Custodians of Conscience: Investigative Journalism and Public Virtue.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. 1905. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1963.

Gournelos, Ted. “Irony, Community, and the Intelligent Design Debate in South Park and The Simpsons.” Electronic Journal of Communication, 18 (2, 3 & 4), 2008: 1-18.

Mueke, D. C.  The Compass of Irony. London: Methuen and Company LTD., 1969.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny? A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

I’m Joking/Just Kidding

A topic on my list of things to cover in this blog are statements of “just kidding” and “I’m joking.”  I started on this in my analysis of Mike Birbiglia’s Thank God for Jokes, but I’ve pulled it out here for ease of reference/hyperlink, and I’ll expand on it soon[-ish].

In the aforementioned special, Birbiglia says:

Like if you think about jokes…. you can’t tell jokes in life almost ever, like at work, or  school or the airport is a great example. I read a story where a guy sneezed on a plane, looks around and he goes, “I have ebola.”

Here’s why that’s not a good joke: they landed the plane. They landed the plane, and they’re met by the guys in hazmat suits, and his defense was “I’m joking!” Which is always this catchall defense when people say dumb things. Like, you can’t tell jokes at work, because at some point in history, some idiot showed up at work and was like, “Nice tits, Betsy!” And Betsy’s like, “What?!” And that guy’s like, “I’m joking!” And the boss is like, “Uuuuuuh, no more jokes!”  Jokes have been ruined by people who aren’t good at telling jokes. A joke should never end with, “I’m joking!” or “Git’r done!”

He later includes Fozzie Bear’s catchphrase, “Waka Waka,” in this mix. The message seems to be that if you have to defend it by labeling it a joke – which catchphrases can also do – then it either wasn’t, at base, a joke, or it really wasn’t funny. As I’ve pointed out, that seemed to be Bill Maher’s biggest problem with his N-word incident.

“I’m joking” and “just kidding” are often abused ways of “taking back” a statement, but nothing that is said or done can truly be taken back. It’s at most placed under erasure, which Jacques Derrida talks so much about [He borrows it from Martin Heidegger; REALLY looking forward to revisiting that author *sarcasm*]. In a nutshell, all you do is strike-through; in Birbiglia’s example, the coworker has (now) said (back then) “Nice tits, Betsy!” It’s still there, he just added a line about not meaning it, or meaning something different by it (if it were ironical).  The original statement can still be read underneath.

Tragedy Plus Time

In my analysis of Mike Birbiglia’s Thank God for Jokes, I included this blurb about how, in an off-hand way, Birbiglia mentions that “Comedy equals tragedy plus time.”  I thought I should break this section out for ease of future reference/hyperlink.

“Comedy equals tragedy plus time.” is a quote attributed by Goodreads and other sources to Mark Twain, who may have said “Humor is tragedy plus time.”

However, Quote Investigator attributes it to a 1957 Cosmopolitan interview with Steve Allen, and his full explanation is worth quoting:

When I explained to a friend recently that the subject matter of most comedy is tragic (drunkenness, overweight, financial problems, accidents, etc.) he said, “Do you mean to tell me that the dreadful events of the day are a fit subject for humorous comment? The answer is “No, but they will be pretty soon.”

Man jokes about the things that depress him, but he usually waits till a certain amount of time has passed. It must have been a tragedy when Judge Crater disappeared, but everybody jokes about it now. I guess you can make a mathematical formula out of it. Tragedy plus time equals comedy.

Mark A. Rayner, attributes a similar quote to Lenny Bruce, who supposedly said,

Satire is tragedy plus time. You give it enough time, the public, the reviewers will allow you to satirize it. Which is rather ridiculous, when you think about it.

Good stuff, but at it’s base, it seems like a rehash of Hobbes’ 1640 statement that laughter is “a sudden glory, arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly” (Chapter ix, § 13; Morreall, Humor). With distance from our own weakness, we can look back and laugh. That’s the tragedy plus time in a nutshell. It is this recognition of people’s ability to change and therefore laugh at our former ignorance or infirmity that really gives a boost to the applicability of Superiority theory.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Hobbes, Thomas. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Part I, Human Nature, Part II, De Corpore Politico; with Three lives.  Ed. J.C.A. Gaskin.  New York: Oxford University, 1994.

Morreal, John.  “Verbal Humor Without Switching Scripts and Without Non-Bona Fide Communication.”  International Journal of Humor Research 17 (2004): 393-400.

Category Updates!

In trying to get more organized here (and as I’ve started to get enough material up), the time has come to start creating sub-categories! There are now six sub-categories of Humor Theory:

  • Theories About Audiences: These theories try to understand the audience’s role in humor.
  • Theories About Comics: These are theories about the person telling the jokes.
  • Theories About Funny: These theories try to tell us why something is funny.
  • Theories About Jokes: These are theories that discuss the structure and other qualities of jokes.
  • Theories About Laughter: These are theories about how and what happens when we laugh.
  • Theories About Spaces: These are theories about where and when the humor takes place.

There are also two new sub-categories of Cases:

  • Comics in the News: These are analyses of news reports on comics’ and the “controversies” that made them newsworthy. People are making statements about comedy by criticizing a comic’s act.
  • Comics Talking Shop: These are my analyses of when comics talk about the craft: joke work. how to write and perform comedy, what is humorous, etc. Comics are explicitly saying something about comedy.

Of course, there’s quite a bit of overlap: spatial theories often include a concept of comic, jokes and audience, audience theories are really about the relationship between comic and audience, theories about laughter are really about audiences, etc.  However, I try to avoid cross categorization if I can help it.

Hopefully, this will help and not confuse.  Of course, the main page is still just a solid scroll anyway…

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Carnival II: Real Action

In a previous post, I discussed a common, simple model of carnivalesque that was based off the idea of a Roman Catholic celebration of Carnival prior to Lent written about most famously by Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin, in his analysis of French Renaissance writer François Rabelais. This simple notion of the carnivalesque was problematic as:

  • Carnival is relegated to specific times and spaces, therefore it will not produce any lasting effects.
  • Carnival is sanctioned by the powers that be, and therefore cannot subvert those powers.
  • If it does anything, Carnival releases tension, which prevents real political action from taking place.
  • Carnival reinforces the rules by calling attention to them.
  • Carnival inverts the power hierarchy, thus reinforcing the idea of a hierarchy.

Refuting the simple Carnival

Rather than Carnivals as harmless, James C. Scott (1990) argues:

  1. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that many powerful political figures frequently tried and failed to stop the festival or censure the activities permitted, and therefore Carnival is not always sanctioned; and
  2. There are several instances in which such festivals led to political rebellion on a grander scale, and therefore Carnival is not necessarily bounded nor guaranteed to perform its function as safety valve.

Rather than a dress rehearsal for the revolution, sometimes it is the revolution, or at least, an integral part.  The carnivalesque is not a tool of system maintenance by virtue of its lack of effectivity – that is a notion wrongly attributed to its simple incarnation.  Rather, it is a tool of activism because in its practical application it is dangerous, which is perhaps best displayed by the attempts to constrain it and thus render it inert.  This is, for me, the sense in which the humorous space is carnivalesque.

The effect of rules

The keys here are the rules. Or rather, the idea that there must be rules. Because stand-up comedy, like Carnival, is thought to hold up a funhouse mirror to society, it is sometimes thought to be a space without rules; in this space, anything can be said.  Despite the simple version, in theory, the decorum of the carnivalesque space permits not just the inversion, but outright violation of social and moral taboos.

However, in practice both humor and Carnival retain rules regarding specific patterns of language and action, and the powers that be seek to apply more.  There are all kinds of rules to stand-up: when the mic or show starts, the order in which each comic will go, how much time they get, obeying the light, how obscene or blue they can be, what are acceptable topics, etc. When governments, or club owners and managers, or journalists and social and cultural critics create boundaries for the carnivalesque space via rules, they display a belief in the volatility of the space.

Policing the rules

Some of these rules governing the space of humor serve to define what is and is not humor and to create a hierarchy of moral and professional acceptability within humor. For example, blue humor, obscenity and dick jokes are not considered “good” jokes.

Jokes, like all texts, are polysemic (Cecarrelli; Condit), having multiple possible meanings, and polyvalent, having multiple possible evaluations (Fiske).  Therefore, to define or describe a joke in a particular way (whether only in popular culture or legally) to a certain extent fixes and limits our potential interpretations to a few, primary interpretations, which may then be more easily policed and enforced.  In short, definitions are rhetorically constructed and provide boundaries for the space, allowing for its policing.

New rules

Obviously, we should not just accept whole cloth a set of rules and definitions derived from an historic model based on a Roman Catholic festival.  Instead, let us examine several specific attempts at setting rules for humor – including definitions, laws, etiquette and decorum – to see what they reveal about the power of humor. For instance:

Kathy Griffin’s photo displayed limits of decorum; a comic can’t pretend she’s beheaded the sitting president, even as art.

Bill Maher displayed that a white man can’t say the N-word, even and perhaps especially as a joke.

Iliza Shlesinger can’t tell other women what to joke about.

Jay Leno & Leslie Jones think you should be funny first, and political or true as an afterthought.

Mike Birbiglia thinks all humor is potentially offensive to someone, because all jokes have to be about something.

[Future posts will do more of this].  Via such definitional limitations, problematic forms of humor are marginalized, if not gotten rid of completely.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World.  Trans. H. Iswolsky.  Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1968.

—.  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  Trans. C. Emerson.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984.

Ceccarelli, Leah.  “Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism.”  Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 395-415.

Condit, Celeste.  “The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy.” Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.  Eds. Lucaites, Condit and Caudill. New York: Guilford, 1999.  494-511.

Fiske, John.  Television Culture.  New York: Routledge, 1987.

Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.  New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1990.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Carnival I: Simple Inversion

It’s fairly common, when talking about humor, to use the word carnivalesque (see for instance Fiske; Gilbert; Miller).  The concept was most famously used by Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin, in his analysis of French Renaissance writer François Rabelais. However, what people usually think they mean when they use the term is a set of simple–and therefore problematic–generic characteristics.

The Carnival

In this “simple carnivalesque,” people believe that the festival of Carnival constitutes a space of play that allows–if not endorses–certain taboo behaviors which thus offsets the observance of Lent. Some say it is a pressure valve that makes space for Lent; we get it out of our system–this is typical of Relief theorists.

Thus we note an immediate problem: to evoke the Carnival is to evoke a particular space and time, pre-packaged with certain rules for its participants–rules that are based on social, moral and psychological precepts, such as decorum.

Inverted Decorum

Robert Hariman argues that, for the Roman orator Cicero, decorum was a system of rules for our actions. In adhering to the rules, we perform the morals of our class or caste, and these rules are enforced by social judgements (e.g. “good boys and girls don’t do that“, etc.). For Cicero, this requires an element of self-discipline.  A relevant example comes from the rules that govern bodily functions (urinating, defecating, sex, etc.):

to perform these functions—if only it be done in private—is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is indecent.  And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar mention of them is free from indecency (De officiis, 1.127).

For Hariman, this is a shift from describing what is moral (versus not) to prescribing moral behavior.

Whereas Huizinga’s play space is pre-moral, when viewed through the lens of Roman Catholic religious practice the rules of Carnival temporarily invert the moral hierarchy of decorum in order to achieve certain political effects.  This inversion seemingly allows those at the lower levels of society to play at being something else; both to treat nobles and even kings with scorn or contempt, and to engage in animalistic behaviors (lust, gluttony, drunkenness and other debauchery) that are generally considered uncivilized and unbecoming. Publicly urinating, defecating or having sex and/or talking about it is suddenly allowed.

Political power?

Some would therefore cast Carnival as serving a political function; in this space and time, we have the ability to not only imagine but perform a world in which the fundamental power structures governing our lives are completely opposite, thus pointing out that such systems are not unchangeable.  However, others have contested this view.

No effects

Ultimately, many critics argue that Carnival and by extension humor have no effect.  Rhetorical critics such as Joanne Gilbert suggest that Carnival is contained by spatial and temporal limits–the space and time of the individual celebration, like Bourbon Street, New Orleans during Mardi Gras, or other streets on the parade route during a parade.  During this time and in these spaces, new rules might apply (Note: the N.O.P.D. will tell you they don’t; all laws are still very much enforced).

Further, these spaces and times are predetermined and sanctioned by the governing institutions–we had to obtain permits and set boundaries (physical as well as the times that it begins and ends).  Because of this limiting and sanctioning process, Gilbert argues, there is little possibility for revolutionary political action; people will act in a manner predetermined by the authorities as acceptable, for a relatively short period of time and within a specified space, then everything will return to normal (see also Eagleton; Harold; Stam; and Stallybrass & White).

Lenny Bruce example

While not using the term carnivalesque, Gilbert also finds a similar argument for a lack of effects in the work of John Limon.  Limon finds the reception of Lenny Bruce’s act to depend on a state Limon calls “inrage,” particularly characterized by the audience’s response to the following joke by Bruce [that I’ve talked about before]:

If you’ve, er [pause]

Heard this bit before.  I want you to tell me.

Stop me if you’ve seen it.

I’m going to piss on you.

Limon finds this joke (which we know is a joke because it’s followed by an unprecedented seventeen seconds of laughter) to rely on a condition in which Bruce’s audience demands to be outraged; thus Bruce replies with obscenity.

However, because they asked for it (and expected to get it), the obscenity cannot be truly outrageous; thus the paradox: “they demand not to be outraged” by the outrageous (16). It would seem that the audience’s expectations have limited humor’s ability even to upset them.  Because of this, Limon notes that in the legal prosecution of Lenny Bruce the court was not acting on behalf of any audience, but on behalf of a theoretical society that may not actually exist–no one in the actual audience was upset.

This is the same as the space of Carnival, where the expectation of rule violation creates a contained space in which the rules are allowed and expected to be inverted, thus seemingly no real political work can be done.  But this is to equate outrage with political action, which is an oversimplification.

Pressure Valve

Once again, Relief theorists might propose that these inversions of behavior represented by a simple carnivalesque serve a system maintenance function, providing a release of tension that preempts the need for civic unrest, but this is not the ability for citizens to act in politically meaningful ways that some people who use the term carnivalesque propose.

Reinforcing the rules

Further, although hierarchies are inverted within the space and time of Carnival, they are ultimately endorsed. First off, Carnival calls attention to specific rules that may already have been points of tension–no one bothers to act on rules that they don’t notice.  And especially when we know that things will return to normal, all we’ve really done is heighten awareness of these rules.

The inversion of the existing hierarchy and standards of decorum, especially when cast as a “safety valve” for a portion of society prone to outright rebellion (e.g. those at the bottom of the social ladder), suggests not that the hierarchy and standards are unnecessary, but instead that they are essential. The inversion reinforces that we have these rules for a reason.

In fact, the temporary inversion only works in a relationship in which the existing hierarchy and rules of decorum are perceived as the norm; the reversal of the normal can only be seen as “letting off steam” to the extent that it is temporary, and that things will soon return to normal.

Inverting versus subverting

At base, the problem is that when you invert the rules, you set up a system in which we have these particular rules, or we have the opposite – but nothing else.  We have one hierarchy or its opposite, but there is still a hierarchy.  The structure remains intact.

This is a reaction to the rules, when what we need is a response. A true subversion of the rules would be to come up with completely different set of rules that change the whole system. And yes, that is a tall order.

We can see this logic of the simple carnival play out in some critic’s work, leading them to argue that humor doesn’t really do anything.  Here I’ll give the example of Joanne Gilbert.

Gilbert example

Gilbert argues that comics are empowered in that they are able to develop a unique voice and get paid for it. She also believes that comics are “politically operant,” able to act in the world.  However, the scope of their operations are severely limited.

For Gilbert, humor is always hostile (i.e. coming from Superiority theory, though in some moments, she reverts to the language of Relief theory).  More to the point, she believes that humor operates in a (simple) carnivalesque space.

The key passage to understanding Gilbert’s theory of what humor can do is, for me, this one:

Although [comics] do not allocate resources or single-handedly transform existing social structures, by performing a subversive discourse they depict and exert pressure upon existing social conditions.  Through humor, they call attention to cultural fissures and fault lines (177).

The use of the terms “subversive” and “exerts pressure” may distract from Gilbert’s main thesis, which is that the comic merely “calls attention” to pre-existing problems. Such a call only works in a system where problems are already known.

Because of Gilbert’s reliance on the simple form of carnivalesque characterized by inversion, she effectively argues that calling attention does not subvert the system, it only inverts it via negation; the true subversion would have to happen later, in a different space.  The structure remains unchanged.  Because, for Gilbert, humor must always be hostile (although it may sometimes also relieve tension), and because humor is partitioned off from political action by its carnivalesque space, it cannot bring us anything new; it cannot create a cultural fissure or fault line, it only draws attention to those already known – a lesser political function.  In short, it cannot be political action, but only, in Augusto Boal’s opinion, a “rehearsal for the revolution” (122). 

This is somewhat analogous to the more simplistic theories of irony and parody [I’ll get these up soon]; because the simple carnivalesque is merely a negation of the status quo, like simple irony and parody it cannot subvert the status quo – it cannot serve the function of Guy Debord’s détournement, the detour, diversion, hijacking, corruption or misappropriation of the spectacle [I’ll get this up soon too].

Summary

Thus we have the following:

  • Carnival is relegated to specific times and spaces, therefore it will not produce any lasting effects.
  • Carnival is sanctioned by the powers that be, and therefore cannot subvert those powers.
  • If it does anything, Carnival releases tension, which prevents real political action from taking place.
  • Carnival reinforces the rules by calling attention to them.
  • Carnival merely inverts the power hierarchy, thus reinforcing the idea of a hierarchy.

In this view of the simple carnivalesque, as in Huizinga, play is preparatory to social-political life; that is, we can learn through play without fearing the repercussions of failure, but also without hope of success.  However, if we reexamine the notion of Carnival, we may find hope; true Carnivals are not so simply cordoned off from political action.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World.  Trans. H. Iswolsky.  Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1968.

—.  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  Trans. C. Emerson.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984.

Boal, Augusto. Theater of the Oppressed.  New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1985.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius.  De officiis.  Trans. Walter Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913.

Debord, Guy.  The Society of the Spectacle.  Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith.  New York: Zone, 1994.

Eagleton, Terry.  Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism.  London: Verso, 1981.

—.  The Ideology of the Aesthetic.Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

Fiske, John.  Television Culture.  New York: Routledge, 1987.

Gilbert, Joanne.  Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender and Cultural Critique. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, 2004.

Hariman, Robert.  “Decorum, Power and the Courtly Style:” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78 (1992): 149-172.

Harold, Christine.  “Pranking Rhetoric: ‘Culture Jamming’ as Media Activism.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 21.3 (2004): 189-211.

Huizinga, Johan.  Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture.  New York: Harper-Row, 1970.

Limon, John.  Stand-Up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America.  Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000.

Miller, Toby.  The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and the Postmodern Subject.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1993.

Stallybrass, P. and A. White. The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1986.

Stam, Robert. Subversive Pleasures: Bakhtin, Cultural Criticism and Film. Johns Hopkins, 1989.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.