Chattoo, The Laughter Effect II. B. How Comedy Works: Creating Feelings and Breaking Down Complexity

In May (2017), Caty Borum Chattoo, co-director of the Center for Media and Social Impact at American University and a comedy fan, released “The Laughter Effect: The [Serious] Role of Comedy in Social Change“, in which she summarizes the research and gives advice on how to use humor to further social issues. As previously described, Chattoo tells of five forms of influence:

  1. attracting attention & facilitating memory
  2. feeling: comedy’s route to persuasion
  3. entering complex social issues
  4. breaking down social barriers
  5. sharing with others

In this fourth installment, I run through her second and third points.

Feeling: Humor’s route to persuasion

Audiences can be persuaded through comedy—but comedy’s route to persuasion is more about feeling and caring than learning.

The ELM

Chattoo turns to Petty & Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) here (especially as it has been applied by Zhang), which theorizes two routes of information processing: central and peripheral.

[W]hen individuals experience serious information and news—and are able to process the information and are highly motivated to do so—they use a central cognitive route of processing by focusing on the merits of the message itself. But in a humor context, attitude shifts may occur in response to peripheral or heuristic cues—such as emotional reactions, liking the message source and believing the source is credible and believable. Persuasion then moves through a different route than the one employed when encountering a strong message delivered in a serious way. As individuals enjoy the comedy message and the messenger, they are less likely to scrutinize and counter-argue against the information, which improves the conditions for persuasion.

The problems with dual models

Such dual-mode or processing models, in my educated opinion, are bunk – at least in the way they are applied to humor.  They are one of the reasons I have to blog in the first place [– I’ll deal with a lot more of them on here soon; they crop up everywhere!].  While it may be true that we can pay close attention or not, why does humor necessarily make us “less likely” to?

Chattoo just argued that audiences actively seek out the information, and that they do so “with active “truth-seeking motivations” – they process the civic information in such a way that sparks ‘reflective thoughts…issue interest, and information seeking.’” Further, she cites Garber, who believes that all the outrage and celebrations of comics these days is ample evidence that we’re not taking their words for granted.  So where did that all go? Aren’t these all instances of audiences taking comedy as “serious information and news,” that they are “highly motivated” to seek out and absorb?

And who’s to say that they are unable to do so?  Obviously we don’t shut off our brains when the comic starts talking.

Further, there’s a lot of evidence that people are lazy and process many messages peripherally – even “strong messages delivered in a serious way” – particularly when they are from your in-group, clan, tribe [there are lots of terms]. Robert Cialdini posits this when he talks about perceived expertise and liking effects – we process our perception of them rather than the message. So the question is: Why single out any form of discourse as “exclusively peripheral”?  It has always struck me as dumb.

Serious messages hurt comedy

Chattoo returns to the idea that overt persuasion can hinder the comedy:

And in fact, by letting the audience in on the idea that the comedy message is designed to be “a message”—overt persuasion—the comedy becomes (perhaps ironically) less effective, triggering the cognitive route to persuasion, including scrutinizing the information or counter-arguing against the messages. For comedy to be a successful vehicle for persuasion in service of a serious social issue, it can’t be seen as trying too hard to explicitly persuade even if it comparts serious information.

There’s the false dichotomy that dual-mode or processing models run up against: either we are scrutinizing the joke, or we are laughing.  This brings back the common interpretations of laughter: that it’s an unconscious, embodied response, not a result of thought. Further, such thinking suggests that we can’t react twice, reassess.

This would have it that after it invokes initial scrutiny, a joke can only produce “clapter” – or “humor support,” like when your significant other says, “that’s funny,” which is not the same as laughing.  Further, after laughing we apparently can’t go back and think it through; or perhaps we’re just less likely to.

The return of the sleeper

These understandings are obviously bunk. The best evidence for this is Chattoo’s own note that there might be that “sleeper effect of comedy—remembering and being influenced by the content of a funny message longer than a serious one.” Can we guarantee that every time we think of the message, we think of it in the same way?  Can it’s influence not change over time?

An easy way to disprove this is the joke that you re-evaluate and laugh again at – the joke that gets funnier the more you think about it. If it can work that way, why can’t we find sense or wisdom in a joke after the laugh?  I have.

Further, even if the above were historically true, idea that audiences are changing and becoming more active would call it into question: the fact that we tend to act in certain ways (that people have traditionally acted in certain ways) in no way means that can’t change (nor that it isn’t already changing).

Nevertheless, we’ll move on to Chattoo’s third point.

Entering complex social issues

Comedic treatment of serious issues helps make complex topics accessible—and amplifies serious information

Chattoo agrees with Popkin that people engage in cost-benefit analysis before actively seeking new information and getting involved in serious issues. Baum suggests that entertainment and comedic treatment of these issues might open the door, serving as a “gateway” to more serious attention, and Feldman and her colleagues have shown this to work. This last bunch argues that dealing with complex issues in an entertaining way can have two effects:

  1. providing minimal (new) exposure to complex issues, and

  2. providing an available knowledge framework that can help audiences make sense of serious information about the same issues in the future.

Chattoo is backtracking a bit, as she’s already noted (with Bartsch & Schneider) that audiences may find new information they would not otherwise encounter. However, the extra bit is that the exposure is “minimal,” that it’s not overwhelming and therefore can invite people into the conversation.

This second effect seems to recall the “priming effect” Chattoo previously noted (though she doesn’t make the connection herself), where we remember the characteristics of the issue that the comic focused on; this is part of the “framework” or terministic screen, comedy provides, from which we make sense of the issue. This also brings to mind the “sleeper effect” previously mentioned, where we remember more of a funny message, than a serious one – this “more” includes the frame or screen.

Taken together, these two effects, allow audiences to “pay greater attention to more serious news about [these social issues] over time.”  Additionally,

[Feldman and colleagues have shown] this impact … as particularly great for those with less formal education and less understanding of or exposure to the issue in the first place [From her section on Satirical News].

The general idea that Chattoo ends with is that comedy complements the serious message.

One final note

There is a trend in studies of humor where the joke is taken as a screen or filter, a way of doing a serious message.  This line of thinking makes makes comedy and humor a “surface” tactic, where the serious message intended is “depth;” it’s a hermeneutics of depth. The deeper motive is always given preference over the surface tactic.

We see this also in the distinction between entertainment and social or political comics.  Humor and jokes are what they do – “surface” – but the material behind the jokes, the intent, is “depth.”

To clarify fully why this hermeneutics of depth bothers me so much, I should return to the base of this project: what happens when you take away all the assumptions of bona fide, serious speech? What is accomplished?

Jokes and stories are ways of communicating; humor is an intention, but it doesn’t have to be the only one.  Comics have traditionally claimed they’re not trying to do anything serious.  Such statements are thought to help create the humorous space, and push us into the humorous, peripheral mode of the ELM, and I’ve already critiqued that here – the times, they are a’changin’.

If the times are changing – if comics are trying to directly address social and political issues through humor (and they say they are), and if audiences are looking to comics for treatment of social and political issues (and Chattoo says they are) – then perhaps there is no such thing any more as a meaningful distinction between bona fide and non-bona fide. But that makes this project all the more important.  What can happen when someone tells a joke? Yes, people can and do express their outrage and adulation on social media, but do they actually change behavior? And can we really expect more of so-called bona fide discourse?

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Bartsch, A., & Schneider, F. M. (2014). Entertainment and politics revisited: how non-escapist forms of entertainment can stimulate political interest and information seeking. Journal of Communication, 64(3), 369-396.

Baum, M. (2003). Soft news goes to war: Public opinion and American foreign policy in the new media age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cialdini, R. Influence: Science and Practice.

Feldman, L., Leiserowitz, A., & Maibach, E., (2011). The Science of satire: The Daily Show and The Colbert Report as sources of public attention to science and the environment. In A. Amarasingam (Ed.), The Stewart/Colbert effect: Essays on the real impact of fake news, (pp. 25-46). Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology Vol. 19, (pp. 123-205). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Popkin, S.L. (1994). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns, 1st Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zhang, Y., (1996). Responses to humorous advertising: The moderating effect of need for cognition. Journal of Advertising, 25(1), 15-32.

Chattoo, The Laughter Effect II. A. How Comedy Works, Influence Begins and Attracting Attention

In May (2017), Caty Borum Chattoo, co-director of the Center for Media and Social Impact at American University and a comedy fan, released “The Laughter Effect: The [Serious] Role of Comedy in Social Change“, in which she summarizes the research and gives advice on how to use humor to further social issues. As previously described, Chattoo tells of five forms of influence:

  1. attracting attention & facilitating memory
  2. feeling: comedy’s route to persuasion
  3. entering complex social issues
  4. breaking down social barriers
  5. sharing with others

In this third installment, I run through her first point after beginning with her detour into “How influence begins.”

How influence begins: Actively seeking comedy

Chattoo points out an advantage that comedy has over other forms of storytelling and persuasion: “people actively seek out comedy.”  This is an advantage, as obviously, without the ability to reach people, you can’t influence them.

Further, rather than being passive receivers of messages, she notes, with Young, that

Audiences who seek out smart, civically-focused comedy and entertainment may do so for more than one reason—to be entertained and to make sense of serious information…. And when audiences seek and use entertainment with active “truth-seeking motivations,” they process the civic information in such a way that sparks “reflective thoughts…issue interest, and information seeking.”

This is a key point that Chattoo fails to apply in future sections, and it marks a significant shift.

When I started writing my dissertation, I was appalled by the state of the research. Everyone assumed that no one looked to humor – and especially stand-up – for serious messages, for advice, for discussions of common problems and social issues.  So when comics discussed such things, researchers treated it as if it didn’t matter – and perhaps it didn’t.

However, Chattoo (& Young) points out that we’re living in a different time; perhaps now people approach and read comedy differently. Perhaps they both laugh and think, are amused yet still informed and engaged.  “The Zombie Apocalypse” paradoxical example still gives us pause, but perhaps the changes are coming.

Further, Chattoo notes that audiences may find new information they would not otherwise encounter (Bartsch & Schneider). As comics address more issues, it’s more likely that they hit on one that is new to some members of their audience.

Attracting attention and facilitating memory

Comedy can expose audiences to new messages – and can help them remember the information.

Advertisers have long known this: unlike advertisements using sex appeals, which can leave us unsure what was being advertised (or uncaring), humorous advertisements get our attention and help us to remember.  However, more recent studies have linked this effect to political and civic communication as well (Xenos & Becker).

Sleeper effect

Chattoo notes that there’s a “sleeper effect of comedy—people remember and are influenced by the content of a funny message longer than a serious one” (here Chattoo cites Nabi, Moyer-Guse & Byrne). Yes, we’ve known at least since Aristotle that strong emotion is the key to memory. We shouldn’t be surprised that humor is no exception.

Priming effect

Further, humor fuels a “priming effect,” in which the “characteristics that had been primed, or made salient, from comedy” “influenced [the audience’s] future judgments” (Moy, Xenos & Hess).  I’ll tie this in later in a way that Chattoo misses, but when a comic deals with the issues, they emphasize certain aspects, and these areas of emphasis can act as a frame, a lens,or as Kenneth Burke would have it, a terministic screen, through which the audience comes to see the issue. That ability to set the frame or screen might prove powerful.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Bartsch, A., & Schneider, F. M. (2014). Entertainment and politics revisited: how non-escapist forms of entertainment can stimulate political interest and information seeking. Journal of Communication, 64(3), 369-396.

Moy, P., Xenos, M. A., & Hess, V. K., (2005). Priming effects of late-night comedy. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(2), 199-210.

Nabi, R., Moyer-Guse, E. ́ & Byrne, S. (2007). All Joking Aside: A Serious Investigation into the Persuasive Effect of Funny Social Issue Messages. Communication Monographs. 74(1), 29-54.

Young, D. G. (2013). Laughter, learning, or enlightenment? Viewing and avoidance motivations behind The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 57(2), 153-169.

Xenos, M.A., & Becker, A.B. (2009). Moments of zen: Effects of The Daily Show on information seeking and political learning. Political Communication, 26(3), 317-332.

Salma Hindy Wants to Humanize Muslims

It’s good to see comics trying to do something with their power.  One such is Salma Hindy.  Steven Zhou interviews Salma Hindy for The Globe and Mail (7/28/2017), and talks about her strategies.

Her intent

Hindy’s friend, Selma Samy Akel, lays it out:

She’s helping humanize Muslims and comedy does that better than anything else, I think.

Hindy herself echoes this sentiment:

I feel like there’s nothing better than comedy to challenge people, because you can try to yell and scream, but it’s really much easier and more effective to just make them laugh.

While she references that “making them laugh” line that characterizes her audience as objects to be acted upon, Hindy’s comments remind us of another point that often is made: humor’s ability to cut through the clutter, to be heard [more on this in the works].

Her jokes

Hindy’s jokes often revolve around the social absurdities she deals with as a “Muslim woman in a politically charged time.” As Zhou notes,

She often makes fun of the “docile Middle Eastern woman” stereotype by making sarcastic reference to not being allowed to drive – an obvious reference to Saudi Arabia, where women can’t obtain a licence. Or she’ll mock the “Islamic terrorist” cliché by complaining that she never got the memo to attend any of the terrorists’ planning meetings, despite sharing the same religion with them.

“Am I not good enough for my own people or something?” she says, exasperated.

She drew loud laughs from the crowd with a story about tripping over some stairs one morning as she rushed to catch the GO train to work. When she got up from her fall and limped to the entrance, she noticed expressions of exaggerated horror on the faces of her fellow commuters.

“They obviously thought I looked like some victimized Muslim woman who sustained an injury from a husband or something,” she joked. “This is when I realized that, guys, being injured is clearly white privilege!

“Like, when other women sprain their ankles it’s an accident, but when it happens to me it gets attributed to the men in my family? C’mon!”

Such jokes tell a story of experience.  To the extent that they’re relatable, it humanizes her and by extension, all Muslims like her. This is a bit straight out of Caty Borum Chattoo’s playbook [The Laughter Effect; working on getting a summary of the relevant bits up].

 

Chattoo, The Laughter Effect I. B. The Why and Potential of Comedy

In May (2017), Caty Borum Chattoo, co-director of the Center for Media and Social Impact at American University and a comedy fan, released “The Laughter Effect: The [Serious] Role of Comedy in Social Change“, in which she summarizes the research and gives advice on how to use humor to further social issues. This is the second installment, where I talk about the situation as she describes it.

Why comedy – and why now?

Chattoo cites a gaggle of research on the rise of online media, and how The Daily Show has lead us into “a surge of comedy programs—both on TV and online” with profound cultural influence.  She cites Garber’s article on comedians as public intellectuals and asks, can comedy “cut through the zeitgeist,” “act as a connector” for people, and are comics “—the observers and savants of the cultural landscape—seen as the true authentic truth-tellers?” This leads her to the conclusion:

If any element of this is true, the process by which comedy is understood and shared within the context of social issues—and the impact on audiences—is worth understanding more precisely.

Comedy’s [potentially powerful] role in social change

Defining social change

Following Singhal and Rogers, Chattoo defines social change as,

The process in which an alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social system. Social change can happen at the level of the individual, community, and organization or a society.

This gives her, she notes, a definition with maximum reach, where we can potentially see effects.

Defining comedy/humor

A major problem for me in Chattoo’s work, is that she uses comedy and humor interchangeably – when most theorists get more mileage by separating the two.  In any case, she uses Palmer’s definition of humor as,

[E]verything that is actually or potentially funny, and the process by which this ‘funniness’ occurs (3).

This, again, gives her maximum scope. However, for the purposes of social change, she limits her scope to the following four types of comedy (which is actually five):

  • Satire
  • Scripted entertainment storytelling
  • Marketing and advertising
  • Stand-up and sketch comedy

I would argue that sketch comedy has more in common with “scripted entertainment storytelling” than stand-up, but we’ll roll with it for now.

She notes that although comedy has been “defined for thousands of years, and studying comedy is not new…. conclusively attempting to understand its connection to potential social change is relatively nascent.”  I would concur; most traditional scholars dismiss humor for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the lack of proven effects, as the study of the CDC’s “The Zombie Apocalypse” social media public health marketing campaign displays.

Defining comedy’s role

Chattoo begins with three qualities comedy possesses, as commonly understood by theorists, which can “serve as a helpful guide for a contemporary understanding of entertainment comedy in service of serious social issues”:

  • attracting attention to raise tough topics (Downe and Freud)
  • situational awareness requiring a kind of shared cultural literacy on behalf of the audience (Allen)
  • providing a voice for the powerless, catharsis (Downe)

Specific to my purpose on this blog, on the first point, Chattoo points out the model represented by Comic Relief, in which a comedy show is used to attract attention and benefit a campaign. However, in this case, the comedy is just a lure, the jokes don’t necessarily have anything to do with the politics of the social issue.

On the latter points, Chattoo notes, with Goldman,

In 1970s America, amidst the tumultuous terrain of the Vietnam War, women’s equality movement and civil rights, stand-up comics and other comedy provided sarcastic, perhaps cathartic, social commentary on the juxtaposed absurdness of reality and the ideal.

For a lot of the social commentary coming from George Carlin and the like, it was best understood in the cultural moment, when people had both the awareness of the topics and a need for catharsis.  But more than these traditional understandings, Chattoo wonders:

Comedy evokes hope and joy, emotions not typically imagined in more somber storytelling about complex social issues. But is emotional response enough to propel attitude change, beyond sharing and setting a media agenda? Will change-makers and storytellers be willing to take the risk, and if so, what should they know in order to make the attempt? And, importantly, what kind of “change”— along a spectrum of learning, feeling, sharing, and acting—is a feasible objective in terms of comedy’s role?

This serves to introduce her project, as from here she launches into her five common forms of influence (plus another factor – active audiences).

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Allen, L. (2014). Don’t forget, Thursday is test[icle]! The use of humour in sexuality education. Sex Education: Sexuality, Society and Learning, 14(4), 387-399.

Downe, P. J. (1999). Laughing when it hurts: Humor and violence in the lives of Costa Rican prostitutes. Women’s Studies International Forum, 22(1), 63–78.

Goldman, N. (2013). Comedy and democracy: The role of comedy in social justice. Retrieved from http://animatingdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Humor%20Trend%20Paper.pdf

Singhal, A., and Rogers, E. (1999). Entertainment-education: a communication strategy for social change. New York, NY: Routledge.

Dustin Wood’s Truth

Danielle Jester interviewed budding comic Dustin Wood for siskiyoudaily.com (7/27/2017), he begins with a discussion of himself as a type of truth teller, at least, in what’s funny:

Q: Do you have favorite topics to write jokes about?

A: They always start with not just truth, but my truth. The best advice I received early on in my career was being told NOT to write what the audience finds funny but write what YOU find funny. After that it was like a dam crumbled in my head. I wrote about all the stuff in my life that was funny. The formula to comedy is often described as just being Tragedy + Time. Growing up with a rare disease has caused a lot of tough situations. But I can look at the absurdity that happens in a day to day basis of my life and convey that to a crowd.

Truth vs. Persona

This is an ongoing theme for me: the question of whether comics are ever “Real” or “Truthful” onstage or if they’re playing a role, embodying at least, in David Misch’s terms. a slippery persona? For critics like myself, it’s obvious, but as for a lot of comics – even when talking about other comics – they deny it. This is what’s going on in the above quote.

Yes, it’s personal to him, and we can also point out that yes, it’s selectively the stuff he can make funny.  However, a new point emerges that’s often overlooked: it should be the stuff that he finds funny – his particular sense of humor.  In my discussion of persona, I’ve pointed out that oftentimes we comics get enticed by the laughs into doing stuff we don’t like to be successful, and it’s good to see comics speaking out against that.

On comedy as self-defense

Q: Do you feel you use comedy as a form of communication? Are you trying to get a certain message out there or more just helping people to have fun?

A: Comedy was always used as a shield when I was a kid. I was an overweight, Catholic Irish kid covered in freckles and blue bumps from a rare disease. I was teased and bullied. I began to use comedy as a shield and a sword. I would make fun of myself before they could. It would soften the blow if it was coming from a comedic, self-deprecating place.

It’s a common story, we’re forced by society to display that we have a sense of humor, that we can take a joke, that we can laugh at ourselves [this segment is still coming], so we take the reins and tell the joke first, sanction their laughter and thereby (in theory) take control of their power to laugh at us.  We allow them to laugh with us, at us.  The question is, does it really work that way?

While we may steer the conversation in particular ways, into well-known jokes, thereby limiting the scope, and while those topics, being familiar, may be easier to cope with, is there a guarantee that the laughers’ deprecate us any less with their laugh?

On a personal note

I don’t usually tell jokes about my height (I’m 5’4”), but I tell a joke onstage, the setup for which is an insult I read on Facebook (admittedly not directed at me, but it could have been):

Someone recently tried to insult me.  They said, “The reason you’re so short is because your dad tried to pull out. The other half of you was left on the bedsheets.”

It gets a bigger laugh than most of my jokes—including my attempt to turn it back on itself. Further, it’s an ugly laugh, a laughing at, that grows as the audience comes to believe that it’s ok to laugh. And it is ok, because I told it, and I know where I’m going with it. But when they laugh harder at this than at my punchline, it displays their lack of sympathy. Maybe I need a stronger punchline.

It points to an enforcement of social boundaries.  In making fun of those at the margins, the joker is highlighting their marginal status, in choosing to laugh (even if it’s fake or a guffaw) we signal that we are in the group – but only barely, and it’s unlikely that by doing so that we will pass the test and be left alone in the future.

Moreover, we may be left uncertain if we even want to be a part of the group at all, though with work-groups, sport or activity groups and peer groups, we may not have a choice, it’s fit in or miss out.

Summary

As comics, we do have to negotiate our onstage personas with the audience; however, we don’t have to kowtow to their whims.  Comics choose what we tell, the way that we tell it, and what we want to make funny about it.  However, we also have to realize that the audience can take that up in a number of different and sometimes problematic ways.

I return to the point I made in my blurbs on Chris Crespo and Josh Blue:

[Once a comic has] acknowledged that he has to talk about his disability on-stage, [it] begs the question: Can you ever really be laughing with him, once you know that he’s only laughing to preempt the laughing at he expected from you? Does the fact that he’s allowing it- even writing the jokes – change the fact that it still might be, at base, ridicule?

Chattoo, The Laughter Effect I. A. Introduction, Preview, Promise and Paradox

In May (2017), Caty Borum Chattoo, co-director of the Center for Media and Social Impact at American University and a comedy fan, released “The Laughter Effect: The [Serious] Role of Comedy in Social Change“, in which she summarizes the research and gives advice on how to use humor to further social issues.  She notes that comedy is promising, but that there are some hard, paradoxical problems as well.

The promise and paradox of comedy

The promise

Chattoo begins with the promise, citing Last Week Tonight with John Oliver’s success at getting action on New York City’s bail bond system. Basically, Oliver’s monologue culminating in a statement that “Increasingly, bail has become a way to lock up the poor, regardless of guilt,” had an immediate impact:

New York City officials changed the city’s bail protocol, immediately impacting 3,000 poor and low-level offenders in the short term, and thousands more in the long run.

That sounds great! Direct effects, comedy FTW!

The paradox

However, she also brings up the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “The Zombie Apocalypse” social media public health marketing campaign, which, while it built buzz and encouraged message sharing, also showed that people who had been exposed to the messages “were significantly less likely to take protective actions in the face of an impending disaster” (Fraustino & Ma). So yeah, increased exposure that backfires? Not good. Chattoo explains:

The two stories illustrate the promise and paradox of comedy in service of serious social challenges. On the one hand, it’s not revelatory to claim, based on compelling anecdotes alone, that comedy can cut through the clutter of today’s unrelenting supply of digital news and information. Comedy may even be able to help set the media agenda in a way that impacts policy, as illustrated in the bail story. On the other hand, to ascribe monolithic, one-size-fits-all characteristics onto comedy risks possible backfiring.

Preview

Chattoo creates a list of comedy formats that she argues work for social change:

  • Satire
  • Scripted entertainment storytelling
  • Marketing and advertising
  • Stand-up and sketch comedy

These formats, she asserts, exert five common forms of influence (to which she adds another factor: active audiences):

  1. Attracting attention,
  2. Persuading through emotion,
  3. Offering a way into complex social issues,
  4. Breaking down social barriers, and
  5. Encouraging sharing (multiplier effect).

In addition, Chattoo explains,

Perhaps most useful for social change efforts, contemporary comedy is uniquely able to set media agendas by creating shared cultural watercooler moments in an increasingly cluttered information age. Comedy doesn’t only preach to the choir—audiences actively seek out comedy as a vital form of entertainment and even as a source of information to understand the world. Comedy’s ability to reach unexpected audiences is crucial.

This report represents fairly recent, “breaking,” stuff (though most of what she’s citing is not), and so I want to delve deeper into her work over the next several days, starting with how she sets the scene, then to the five effects (plus active audiences), next moving on to satire, parts of storytelling and stand-up comedy, then her final advice.  On the way, I’ll probably break out her “Big Theories” and the authors she’s working from.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References

Fraustino, J. D., & Ma, L. (2015). CDC’s Use of Social Media and Humor in a Risk Campaign—“Preparedness 101: Zombie Apocalypse.” Journal of Applied Communication, 222-241.

Joel McHale Wants to Make Trump Laugh

In an interview with  Joel McHale of foxnews.com (7/25/2017), Blanche Johnson talks about “making an audience laugh” in a different way:

BJ: Joel McHale… says he’d like to go back to Washington to make President Trump laugh.

JM: If he would show up I would do it. I would do it in a heartbeat. If they ask me to do it and he was coming… “f–k yeah.” I think it’s important for presidents –- especially American presidents, because they are literally the most powerful person on the planet — to show that they can take a joke…

BJ: He said every president has been able to handle a joke until now, and he thinks it’s important to show other countries our leader can laugh.

JM: …[In] a lot of other countries, reporters are put in jail for making derogatory comments or perceived jokes or something. In America, it’s the best country in the world, because reporters and comedians can say stuff.

JM: Comedians, especially, can say jokes, and the last few presidents have all been like, “Cool, thanks, now we’ll go back to defending democracy.”

Whereas Johnson uses the term “making [an audience] laugh,” she’s using the word “make” in a different sense than we’ve seen before.  Before, we’ve talked about how this phrasing reduces an audience to an object that is acted upon.

Here, McHale is talking about the value of having a sense of humor, to “take a joke,” and the pressure to not be “that guy” – the guy that can’t take it. In our culture, that pressure is immense. Thus, if McHale tells a joke in front of and about Trump, Trump has to take it. He must at minimum “guffaw,” or risk showing that he doesn’t have a sense of humor.

So this “making Trump [or anyone in power] laugh,” is not about acting on him in a mind controlling way, but employing social norms to provoke or coerce a laugh. [I’ll have more about the pressure to have a sense of humor coming soon – soo many articles to cover!]

Megan Garber on Comics as Public Intellectuals

This one’s an oldie, but I came across it in some research recently, and it needs to be in this discussion. Megan Garber, in an article for The Atlantic (5/28/2015), saw in Amy Schumer’s “Court of Public Opinion” sketch the marks of a trend: “[J]okes that tend to treat humor not just as an end in itself, but as a vehicle for making a point.”

Why has this happened? For Garber, “There was an unmet need” left by our traditional news media, so comedy stepped up to fill it.  However, Garber mentions a definition of comedy that could hamstring her entire thesis.

What comedy does

Garber asserts,

The point of comedy has always been, on some level, a kind of productive subversion…. [Comedy forms] are forms of creative destruction, at their height and in their depths…

This is a fairly common view of humor that I haven’t yet had the opportunity to address: that it is subversive and destructive, even if productively and creatively so.  That anything that is created in comedy is so because something else was destroyed or demolished by it.  That comedy (or perhaps meaningful comedy) only tears things down, it never builds things up.

I know, Garber’s own discussion seems to correct us on this point, but that’s the internal logic breaking down – it’s a performative contradiction of this definition.  Garber sees comedy and humor as a form of cultural criticism and a force for social change.

Critical cultural comedy

Garber notes that TV comedy, “the stuff that is firmly rooted in traditions of sketch and standup,” is talking on meaningful subjects:

Its jokes double as arguments. “Comedy with a message” may be vaguely ironic; it is also, increasingly, redundant.

So when Schumer, in a set that aired on her show, comments with purposeful nonchalance that “we’ve all been a little bit raped,” she may be making viewers laugh. But she is, much more importantly, making us squirm. She’s daring us to consider the definition of “rape,” and also the definition of another word that can be awkward in comedy and democracy alike: “we.” She’s making a point about inclusion and exclusion, about the individuality of experience, about the often flawed way we think about ourselves as a collective. This is comedy at only the most superficial level; what it is, really, is cultural criticism.

She’s going out on a limb a bit with the “definition of ‘we’ stuff,” and she recites the “making viewers laugh” line that subtly de-powers audiences by making them objects, but I’ll tackle those points in a moment.

I can agree, Schumer is tackling the difficult issue of rape – she’s making a rape joke. And it’s one that “works” (if it does) because it plays about the edges of the issue; it plays with the definition, and that’s the province of cultural criticism.

Similar to the performative contradiction pointed out above, cultural criticism is, to some, only in the practice of tearing down some monolithic social and cultural structures.  However, critics who use this definition overlook (or redefine as “something else”) critical acts that celebrate a text, that produce new ways of looking at a thing, issue or idea, that expand the discussion, rather than curtailing it. Comedy and play does the latter, as Garber seems to stress.

Abbi Jacobson

Garber includes a decent list of comics in this vein: George Carlin, Richard Pryor, Joan Rivers, Keegan Michael Key, Jordan Peele, Abbi Jacobson, Ilana Glazer, Sarah Silverman, Patton Oswalt, Louis C.K., Nick Kroll, Stephen Colbert, Jon Stewart, John Oliver, Larry Wilmore. All of whom, she says, actively engage in some level of cultural critique, which is counter the traditional comic’s intention of just trying to get a laugh.

Intention

Garber points out that comedy has changed over time:

As comedy began to do a better job of reflecting the world, it began, as well, to take on the responsibilities associated with that reflection. It began to recognize the fact that the long debate about the things comedy owes to its audiences and itself—the old “hey, I’m just making a joke” line of logic—can be partially resolved in the idea that nothing, ultimately, is “just a joke.” Humor has moral purpose. Humor has intellectual heft. Humor can change the world.

We can pin on Schumer the intention of doing a cultural critique – that in addition to the traditional comic’s intent of trying to get a laugh, she also knew she was writing a joke about rape, she was perhaps trying to make us think about how widespread the issue is, how fuzzy the lines can be – she’s trying to change the world. Garber goes further in describing the comic’s intentions:

They’re exploring and wrestling with important ideas. They’re sharing their conclusions with the rest of us. They’re providing fodder for discussion, not just of the minutiae of everyday experience, but of the biggest questions of the day.… these are bits intended not just to help us escape from the realities of the world, but also, and more so, to help us understand them. Comedians are fashioning themselves not just as joke-tellers, but as truth-tellers—as intellectual and moral guides through the cultural debates of the moment.

As Mike Sacks, an editor at Vanity Fair and the author, most recently, of Poking a Dead Frog: Conversations with Today’s Top Comedy Writers, told me: There’s a general feeling right now that “comedy can change people’s opinions.”

Both of these statements place emphasis on the comics: they explore, wrestle, share, provide, intend and fashion themselves, they speak truth (to power?) and through their comedy they try to “change people’s opinions.”

Garber sees in both happy and indignant news headlines alike evidence of the influence of comics, and I couldn’t agree more. My problem is that some, like Neil Postman, would argue that we’re just “amusing ourselves to death,” that discussions by and about comics – and worse, discussions about discussions by and about comics (like this blog) – are simply wastes of our collective time; that none of it matters in terms of real-world, political change.  While we can point to anecdotal evidence that people changed their views based on a bit or joke, there’s little hard research to support it.

So perhaps Schumer is trying to tell the truth, to change opinions but if you asked Schumer, I’d bet all I have that playing with the definition of “we” never entered her head. The “we” stuff, that’s on Garber. Which reveals a point she makes very clear: we [the monumental audience] allow it; we do the work.

Audience power

Earlier, I pointed out Garber’s use of “making the audience laugh,” as marking a performative contradiction.  This phrase, as I’ve discussed before, falls under the popular view of audiences as objects.  In direct contradiction to this, consider this quote:

[Comedy forms have] long allowed us to talk about things that taboos, or at the very least taste, might otherwise preclude…. [Comedians are] people who [use] laughter as a lubricant for cultural conversations—to help us to talk about the things that [need] to be talked about.

As in a previous quote where comics “provide fodder,” here comics “allow,” and “help us to talk about the things that [need] to be talked about,” not simply that they allow the comics to talk about what they want (though the space of humor does that too); it’s “we” who do the talking.  If we look back, in the previous quote, it was we who ask comics to give us more moral messages as fodder for our conversations. The audience isn’t a passive object; for Garber, we are active.

[Comics] most important function is to stimulate debates among the rest of us. They are adjuncts–… to the several institutions that have been self-consciously modeled as guardians of the national discourse. And we, for our part … [collectively] allow them to be.

I like this idea that comics are teachers, as I’m both and frequently see the overlap. I give my students and my audiences material, but it’s they who do the thinking, the work, the learning. And whereas my tenured position is granted by the University, my position as an adjunct comic is granted only by the audience.

Further, it’s we who do the watching, and that has fundamentally changed the way humor is delivered to us.

Changing the form

Garber notes that we watch so much comedy via the internet, that the form has evolved:

Comedy, like so much else in the culture, now exists largely of, by, and for the Internet.

Everything is packaged (or eventually repackaged) to hit the internet consumer –  sketches, bits and rants are regularly created for or posted to YouTube. One more important quote from the middle, to serve as Garber’s conclusion:

[T]here are two broad things happening right now—comedy with moral messaging, and comedy with mass attention—and their combined effect is this: Comedians have taken on the role of public intellectuals.

Of course, that’s just one journalist’s opinion, though she does get taken up on this point by a policy mover and shaker, Caty Borum Chattoo, whose project is the reason why I’ve come back to this article.  [Look for that write up in the days ahead!]

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

Sigmund Freud’s Jokes part A. II. b. 6. The Techniques of Conceptual Jokes – Problems

This is the thirteenth of several installments on Sigmund Freud’s Jokes [Witz] and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905; free eBook) – and the reactions to it. Still trying for clarity.

In this installment, I’m still addressing his second chapter, and his laundry list of joke techniques, which he is trying to narrow down to a few meta-types. We’ve moved on to the “Techniques of conceptual jokes,” which he says rely more on the situation for their humor. However, along the way, Freud has said some weird things that a lot of people call him on.

In particular, he makes a distinction between the comic and jokes [Witz], and begins to hint about jests [Scherz], he characterizes his jokework process as concerned only with the point of view of the joker, which he asserts can be known, he admits he still doesn’t know what a joke is, but “he knows it when he sees it,” he distinguishes his “opposites” from irony proper, and allusions and riddles from jokes. Let’s address each of these in turn.

The comic versus jokes and jests

Freud differentiates the “comic” from “jokes” a bit in the introduction, stating with Theodor Lipps that the comic is what is humorous or funny, but jokes are the result of an active joker. He notes that Kuno Fischer says jokes are a subset of the comic that “bring forward what is hidden.” However, Freud leaves off fully differentiating the comic from jokes.  And he again defers that in chapter II:

We must keep to our view that the technique of this last group of jokes that we have examined lies in nothing else than in bringing forward “faulty reasoning.” But we are obliged to admit that their examination has so far led us more into obscurity than understanding. (47)

This issue is important because it overlaps other problems in Freud’s theory, like the difference between a joker’s intention and the joke’s reception by the audience.

Freud hints through an example that jests [Scherz] and jokes [Witz] might apply to the same thing (56), but we should know there’s a distinction he’ll make there later.

Author versus audience intention

Freud considers and dismisses the question of an audience finding a displacement in a joke that may not have been intended. He announces that he is interested in “jokework” or “the psychical processes involved in the construction of the joke” (38).  He is not interested in the understanding or “taking in” of the joke – at least, not until later (38).

This is part and parcel to the difference between the comic (humorous, funny) and jokes: the comic can be found, jokes must be conceptualized and told.  Further, this omission of the audience, for myself and many others, is key and represents a mistake that gets carried on by a lot of early humor theorists – that it’s only the joke writer, or more specifically, how and why the critic thinks the joke was written, that matters, and he claims he can tell the difference:

If this distinction is not clear to us, we have an unfailing means of bringing it tangibly before our eyes in our attempts at reduction. (38)

I’m not convinced.

Characterizing jokes

Freud also includes a brief definition of “‘characterizing’ jokes“: a joke that “seeks by an example to illustrate a [person’s] characteristic[s]” (39).

What’s a joke?

Freud admits he isn’t really sure if the examples qualify as jokes.

It is the case, however, that in a number of instances we are in doubt whether the particular example ought to be called a joke or not…. In coming to our decision, we can base ourselves on nothing but a certain “feeling,” which we may interpret as meaning that the decision is made in our judgement in accordance with particular criteria that are not yet accessible to our knowledge” (43).

This kind of “I can’t define obscenity, but I know it when I see it” definition rarely flies.

Analogies

When he gets to analogies, Freud again is tripped up:

We have already admitted that in some of the examples we have examined we have not been able to banish a doubt as to whether they ought to be regarded as jokes at all; and in this uncertainty we have recognized that the foundations of our enquiry have been seriously shaken. But I am aware of this uncertainty in no other material more strongly or more frequently than in jokes of analogy. There is a feeling – and this is probably true of a large number of other people under the same conditions – which tells me “this is a joke, I can pronounce this to be a joke” even before the hidden essential nature of jokes has been discovered. This feeling leaves me in the lurch most often in the case of joking analogies. If to begin with I unhesitatingly pronounce an analogy to be a joke, a moment later I seem to notice that the enjoyment it gives me is of a quality different from what I am accustomed to derive from a joke. And the circumstance that joking analogies are very seldom able to provoke the explosive laugh which signalizes a good joke makes it impossible for me to resolve the doubt in my usual way – by limiting myself to the best and most effective examples of a species. (60)

Again, it’s a “feeling,” but in the case of analogies, it’s of a different “quality.” Further, the best jokes “provoke” an “explosive laugh.”  Here we see the first instance of Relief theory – that there’s a hydraulic pressure building that “explodes” when “provoked.”

Further, after working through several humorous analogies and finding them wanting, Freud says,

So far we have found that whenever an analogy strikes us as being in the nature of a joke it owes this impression to the admixture of one of the joke-techniques that are familiar to us. (64).

What all this analysis has shown is that the joke [Witz], or more specifically the jokework, though it might incorporate many techniques, is not a term used to describe the whole of a joking statement. There are specific components that are jokework, and others that might best be described as “humor adjacent,” strange, quirky, interesting or curious but not bringing a laugh on their own. Freud expresses his inability to parse out the differences a bit later

But, that being so, we are completely at a loss to see what it is that determines the joking characteristic of analogies, since that characteristic certainly does not reside in analogy as a form of expression of thought or in the operation of making a comparison. All we can do is to include analogy among the species of “indirect representation” used by the joke-technique and we must leave unresolved the problem which we have met with much more clearly in the case of analogies than in the methods of joking that we came across earlier. No doubt, moreover, there must be some special reason why the decision whether something is a joke or not offers greater difficulties in analogies than in other forms of expression. (65)

So Freud kicks that can down the road.  However, he does identify a lot of things that are not jokes.

Distinction between opposites and irony

Freud doesn’t limit either opposites or overstatement to jokes, but extends it to other forms of persuasion, like Mark Antony’s speech at the funeral of Caesar in Shakespeare’s Julias Caesar: “For Brutus is an honorable man…” Freud notes,

But we call this “irony” and no longer a joke. The only technique that characterizes irony is representation by the opposite. Moreover we read and hear of “ironical jokes.” So it can no longer be doubted that technique alone is insufficient to characterize the nature of jokes. Something further is needed which we have not yet discovered. But on the other hand it remains an uncontradicted fact that if we undo the technique of a joke it disappears. For the time being we may find difficulty in thinking how these two fixed points that we have arrived at in explaining jokes can be reconciled. (54)

Ok, so irony is a type of representation by the opposite, but it’s not joking – irony by itself is not jokework, or at least, not always – and Freud defers decision on this until a later time.

Distinction between allusions and jokes

Freud talks at length about various forms of allusion, but when when it comes down to it, allusion isn’t always a joke either.

Allusion is perhaps the commonest and most easily manageable method of joking…. But it precisely reminds us once more of the fact that had begun to puzzle us in our consideration of the technique of jokes. An allusion in itself does not constitute a joke; there are correctly constructed allusions which have no claim to such a character. Only allusions that possess that character can be described as jokes. So that the criterion of jokes, which we have pursued into their technique, eludes us there once again. (58-59)

Distinction between jokes and riddles

Freud does say something here about riddles: Basically, for a riddle to be a joke, it must possess unification:

The great majority of all such riddles [those that are not jokes] lack unification. That is to say, the clue by which one syllable is to be guessed is quite independent of those that point to the second or third, as well as of the indication which is to lead to the separate discovery of the whole. (49)

Summary

If we were to occupy ourselves by cataloging all the things that are not jokes – or not always jokes – we’d never finish.  Freud will eventually answer these questions.  Here he’s just building narrative tension; however, most of us don’t find those answers, when they do come, to be satisfactory.  And I haven’t even begun to discuss his examples; apparently, Freud thinks that it’s funny that all Jewish men are dirty and don’t bathe, and that many Jewish women are unattractive and unmarriable. Quite the recurring themes.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

101 Posts (Oops! 102!)

Today’s posts make over 100 that I’ve put up in my blog, The Critical Comic, and all in less that 2 months! It’s been frantic, frustrating, crazy! I feel pulled in a dozen directions. My saving grace is that very few are reading – I’ve had one comment and no subscribers, so….

Not my worry, I started this to work, and at this stage, I can say that I’ve done that. Hopefully, I can roll this momentum forward, get my book chapter done and roll into the semester, staying on top of this. Eventually, this may flesh out into an online textbook for a course (or a book deal), but for right now, I’m engaging new material and reevaluating my previous work on this project, and that’s more than I’ve done in the last… five years anyway.

Thanks to anyone still reading. Hang in there, I’m still working. If you have any requests or suggestions, don’t hesitate to comment.

Cheers!