Carnival II: Real Action

In a previous post, I discussed a common, simple model of carnivalesque that was based off the idea of a Roman Catholic celebration of Carnival prior to Lent written about most famously by Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin, in his analysis of French Renaissance writer François Rabelais. This simple notion of the carnivalesque was problematic as:

  • Carnival is relegated to specific times and spaces, therefore it will not produce any lasting effects.
  • Carnival is sanctioned by the powers that be, and therefore cannot subvert those powers.
  • If it does anything, Carnival releases tension, which prevents real political action from taking place.
  • Carnival reinforces the rules by calling attention to them.
  • Carnival inverts the power hierarchy, thus reinforcing the idea of a hierarchy.

Refuting the simple Carnival

Rather than Carnivals as harmless, James C. Scott (1990) argues:

  1. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that many powerful political figures frequently tried and failed to stop the festival or censure the activities permitted, and therefore Carnival is not always sanctioned; and
  2. There are several instances in which such festivals led to political rebellion on a grander scale, and therefore Carnival is not necessarily bounded nor guaranteed to perform its function as safety valve.

Rather than a dress rehearsal for the revolution, sometimes it is the revolution, or at least, an integral part.  The carnivalesque is not a tool of system maintenance by virtue of its lack of effectivity – that is a notion wrongly attributed to its simple incarnation.  Rather, it is a tool of activism because in its practical application it is dangerous, which is perhaps best displayed by the attempts to constrain it and thus render it inert.  This is, for me, the sense in which the humorous space is carnivalesque.

The effect of rules

The keys here are the rules. Or rather, the idea that there must be rules. Because stand-up comedy, like Carnival, is thought to hold up a funhouse mirror to society, it is sometimes thought to be a space without rules; in this space, anything can be said.  Despite the simple version, in theory, the decorum of the carnivalesque space permits not just the inversion, but outright violation of social and moral taboos.

However, in practice both humor and Carnival retain rules regarding specific patterns of language and action, and the powers that be seek to apply more.  There are all kinds of rules to stand-up: when the mic or show starts, the order in which each comic will go, how much time they get, obeying the light, how obscene or blue they can be, what are acceptable topics, etc. When governments, or club owners and managers, or journalists and social and cultural critics create boundaries for the carnivalesque space via rules, they display a belief in the volatility of the space.

Policing the rules

Some of these rules governing the space of humor serve to define what is and is not humor and to create a hierarchy of moral and professional acceptability within humor. For example, blue humor, obscenity and dick jokes are not considered “good” jokes.

Jokes, like all texts, are polysemic (Cecarrelli; Condit), having multiple possible meanings, and polyvalent, having multiple possible evaluations (Fiske).  Therefore, to define or describe a joke in a particular way (whether only in popular culture or legally) to a certain extent fixes and limits our potential interpretations to a few, primary interpretations, which may then be more easily policed and enforced.  In short, definitions are rhetorically constructed and provide boundaries for the space, allowing for its policing.

New rules

Obviously, we should not just accept whole cloth a set of rules and definitions derived from an historic model based on a Roman Catholic festival.  Instead, let us examine several specific attempts at setting rules for humor – including definitions, laws, etiquette and decorum – to see what they reveal about the power of humor. For instance:

Kathy Griffin’s photo displayed limits of decorum; a comic can’t pretend she’s beheaded the sitting president, even as art.

Bill Maher displayed that a white man can’t say the N-word, even and perhaps especially as a joke.

Iliza Shlesinger can’t tell other women what to joke about.

Jay Leno & Leslie Jones think you should be funny first, and political or true as an afterthought.

Mike Birbiglia thinks all humor is potentially offensive to someone, because all jokes have to be about something.

[Future posts will do more of this].  Via such definitional limitations, problematic forms of humor are marginalized, if not gotten rid of completely.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions?

References:

Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World.  Trans. H. Iswolsky.  Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1968.

—.  Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.  Trans. C. Emerson.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984.

Ceccarelli, Leah.  “Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism.”  Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 395-415.

Condit, Celeste.  “The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy.” Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.  Eds. Lucaites, Condit and Caudill. New York: Guilford, 1999.  494-511.

Fiske, John.  Television Culture.  New York: Routledge, 1987.

Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.  New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1990.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.