Incongruity Theory

Incongruity Theory is based on Aristotle’s (and Cicero’s and others’) view of humor as derived from expectancy violation. Proponents of this view include James Beattie, George Campbell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant, Soren Kierkegaard, and Henri Bergson.

More about the theory:

Expectancy Violations

Aristotle also thought humor occurred with one creates an expectation in the audience and then violates it (3, 2; Morreal). The Roman teacher Cicero similarly said, “The most common kind of joke is that in which we expect one thing and another is said; here our own disappointed expectation makes us laugh.” (ch. 63; Morreal).

John Morreal notes that,

This approach to joking is similar to techniques of stand-up comedians today. They speak of the set-up and the punch (line). The set-up is the first part of the joke: it creates the expectation. The punch (line) is the last part that violates that expectation. In the language of the Incongruity Theory, the joke’s ending is incongruous with the beginning.

Although, some, like Kenneth Burke argue that it’s not the violation per se that provokes a laugh, but an ironic satisfaction.  We laugh because we really should have seen that coming. This is also the basis of verbal irony, and Victor Raskin’s Script Theory. This is also the basis of verbal irony, and also parody, that both scripts were possible, but we usually don’t see the second one until the punch line reveals it.

Paradox

These “expectancy violations” also work when a situation cannot be reconciled, or is paradoxical. In these cases, we laugh as a sign that we have given up on reconciling the incongruous. As Immanuel Kant puts it, “In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there must be something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, can find no satisfaction). Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing” (First Part, sec. 54; Morreal).

Wit and Judgment

A more modern take is that incongruity is a surprising relationship between two things thought to be disparate (an exercise of wit), or a distinction between two things thought to be the same (an exercise of judgment); in both cases, a “difference between what one expects and what one gets, a lack of consistency and harmony” (Berger, 8).

Usage

Incongruity theory is the reigning “champion” of the three major theories, as it explains many more diverse forms of humor than the other two (Superiority and Tension Release), including puns and word play. More recently, some authors have labeled the convergence in humor of two possible interpretive frameworks bisociation,  and use it to discuss a distinct spatialization of humor, the space of paradox (Koestler; Mulkay). However, theoretical popularity isn’t my concern; usage is, and people do talk about jokes and comics like they know this theory.

Political Potential?

Things like puns and wordplay may not have deep political overtones. However, Kenneth Burke’s “perspective by incongruity” also might productively fit here, which allows for the possibility that by placing two disparate ideas in conversation (wit), new aspects of both come to light. By the same token, judgement can bring up differences in things thought to be similar. Thus humor may be used to provoke thought.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Additions? Applications?

References:

Aristotle, The Rhetoric.

Berger, Arthur Asa. “Humor: An Introduction.” American Behavioral Scientist 30.1 (1987): 6-15

Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Beattie, J., 1779, “Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition,” in Essays, 3rd ed., London.

Burke, Kenneth. “Comedy, Humor and the Ode.” Attitudes Toward History. Berkeley: University of California, 1939/1984.

Campbell, George? [I’ll chase this one down].

Cicero, On the Orator (De Oratore)

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. (esp. I, I, 54). Trans. J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner, 1790/1951.

Kierkegaard, S., 1846 [1941], Concluding Unscientific Postscript, D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (tr.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

–––, [JP], Journals and Papers, Vol. 2, H. Hong and E. Hong (eds. and trs.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

Koestler? [I’ll chase this one down: nearly certain it’s from American Behavioral Scientist 30.1 (1987): ]

Morreal, John. “Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html. 2016.

Mulkay, Michael. On Humor: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. New York: Basil, 1988.

Schopenhauer, A., 1818/1844 [1907], The World as Will and Idea (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 6th ed., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Relief Theory

Sometimes called the “Tension Release Theory,” this is Freud’s (and others’) view that humor is derived from a release of pent up energy.

More about the theory:

Hydraulic Model

John Morreall traces this theory back to Lord Shaftesbury’s 1709 “hydraulic” model, which held that men (sic) had “natural, free [“animal”] spirits” that required release or they would “vent” in undesirable ways. Apparently, we’re all seething cauldrons of fluid and gas, trying to get out and making us wacky.  Variations of this theory come from John Dewey, Herbert Spencer and Sigmund Freud.

Desire and Taboos

Perhaps most popular is Freud’s notion that people laugh when they satisfy “an instinct (whether lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle that stands in its way” (101). Freud relates those instincts to his theory of unconscious desire, particularly for aggression and sex, though this has been expanded to all taboos (including scatological [potty humor] or breaches in decorum [like obscenity]). The obstacle in these cases is most frequently the conscious, an effect of socialization. Humor occurs as a release of tension when we realize that we are allowed to delight in (previously) taboo matters (again, primarily violence and sex).

This explains why we like fart and poop jokes – the only ones that consistently make my wife laugh.  It explains why some like dick jokes, and why people laugh explosively at certain “taboo” words, or when they’re in uncomfortable situations.  It purports to explain why nervous people seemingly laugh at anything.

Usage

Morreall holds that no scholar in philosophy or psychology expresses this theory anymore. For one thing, it does not always apply – but then, none of these theories do. For another, other theories explain the same phenomenon – and yes, there is a LOT of overlap.  Also, if comics consciously write jokes, then at least part of the process is not “unconscious”; the audience must “get it.”  But perhaps it’s calculated to play on the unconscious processes of the audience – and perhaps the comic doesn’t even know why it works. Further – and most telling – is that those who repress the most should laugh the hardest, but they don’t; people who express these tensions do.

Nevertheless, my interest here is in how people talk about humor, and people frequently talk about (or talk around) concepts central to Relief Theory when they write and analyze jokes.

Sarah Silverman references relief/release explicitly in her 2017 Netflix special, A Speck of Dust. She builds a scene in which a girl is puking so hard she can’t stop and then she thinks she is about to get raped, but it turns out, she was just also crapping her pants. There’s a lot of silence as the story builds, but when the trick is revealed, the audience laughs, and Silverman acknowledges that this release is exactly what she was trying to do.

Safety Valves and Political Potential

People taking this position view humor as a safety valve; they see a problem in the situation or society, and the humor merely serves as catharsis for that need. Humor thus has no social force; it simply relieves a force resulting from a situation that pre-exists it. However, a safety valve still might serve a political function as it may mollify a public, or obscure or trivialize an issue.

The theory holds, if we agree that racism is a problem, then jokes about systemic racism don’t actually solve the problem, but bleed off our discomfort or anger, making us at best more calm for a time, and at worst less likely to do anything but to continue to joke.  This is the premise of such works as Neil Postman’s, Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985).  On the other hand, if nothing can be done, relief doesn’t seem like a bad thing, and it may just keep the issue in the public eye – we’re still here, and we’re still not happy.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Extensions? Applications?

References:

Dewey, John. “The Theory of Emotion,” Psychological Review 1 (1894): 553–569.

Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. 1905. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1963.

Morreall, John. “Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html, 2016.

Postman, Neil.  Amusing Ourselves to Death. 1985. New York: Penguin.

Shaftesbury, Lord. “Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour,”  Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 1st ed., London (1709, republished in 1711, 4th edition in 1727).

Spencer, H.  “On the Physiology of Laughter,” Essays on Education, Etc. 1911. London: Dent.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Learning Curves

Hey all,

I’m still trying to wrap my head around this project, here 1/2 a week in.  I’m learning a lot about WordPress, and what it can and can’t easily do, and I’m struggling to translate my academic writing/voice to a more friendly, humorous and understandable one.

I’ve moved some stuffy out of category descriptions onto their own posts so I can cross-reference and connect things with tabs.  Oh, and I added more pics.  Hopefully I won’t get sued for image use, but hey, so far, no one is seeing it.

Thanks to anyone who’s still here for bearing with me, and welcome to any newcomers.  This project is taking shape – ssllloooowwwlllyy.

Still to come, a discussion of Carnivalesque, comparisons of Kathy Griffin and Bill Maher to Sarah Silverman and Michael Richard’s racist incidents, as well as a description of the joke writing process.

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Superiority Theory

Socrates/Plato’s (and others’) view of humor as derived from ridicule.  The forms usually attached to this mode of humor are irony, parody, and satire, which expose and possibly correct human problems and failings.

More about the theory:

Scorn & Self-Ignorance

For Plato, humor is malicious, nasty, mean, or hurtful; it’s a form of scorn. “Taken generally,” he says, “the ridiculous is a certain kind of evil, specifically a vice,” more specifically, self-ignorance (Philebus, 48–50). He says that the people we laugh at imagine themselves to be wealthier, better looking, or more virtuous than they really are. In laughing at them, we take delight in something evil—their self-ignorance—and that malice is morally objectionable.

So this is where we laugh at and mock people, like dirty hippies, “libtards” and yuppies, and science deniers (or the alt-right, 45-ers, or Tea Baggers), because, in our opinion, they’re hypocritical, or think they’re smarter than we think they are.

“Imitation of Men Worse Than Average”

Many people attribute to Aristotle the idea that “comedy is based upon ‘an imitation of men worse than average,’” though this quotation developed post-Aristotle by scholars who had read his writing on comedy prior to its disappearance (Berger, 7 n3). However, perhaps also in this vein, Aristotle says in The Rhetoric (2, 12), that wit is educated insolence; perhaps the whole thing is a ruse, a trick or a facade meant to entertain.

This can be seen in all kinds of humorous characters: the fish-out-of-water, the rube or hick, the fool, the clown, etc. So basically, Larry the Cable Guy, Homer Simpson, Buster Keaton, the Marx Brothers, etc. However, if we imitate a type of person, can we guarantee that there are no stereotyping effects that spill over onto people like those portrayed?  Do we laugh at individuals or at the “type”?

Eminency Over Infirmity – Even for Ourselves

A more modern take is offered by Thomas Hobbes, who states that laughter is “a sudden glory, arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly” (Chapter ix, § 13; Morreall, Humor). It is this recognition of people’s ability to change and therefore laugh at our former ignorance or infirmity that really makes the theory applicable in a lot of situations.

For instance, Ellen DeGeneres used to do a bit about tripping over something, and playing it off as if she were just starting to run.  It’s probably something we’ve all done at some point, so we can laugh along with her, at ourselves.

Ridicule

Since humor in this mode is mean-spirited, people don’t like it – especially when they’re on the receiving end. Roger Scruton considers amusement to be an “‘attentive demolition’ of a person or something connected with a person” (Morreall, Humor). “If people dislike being laughed at,” Scruton says, “it is surely because laughter devalues its object in the subject’s eyes” (in Morreall, Laughter, 168).

Obviously, there is a line between humorous and serious ridicule, and different people have different tolerance levels. I don’t personally find a lot of pranking or ridiculing humor funny because it just seems mean.  Also, there’s a lot of hyper-masculinity caught up in “taking a joke,” and “laughing it off,” what we call “the guffaw,” when the joker seems to be going out of their way to take pot-shots or “push the envelope.”  But how frequently do people talk about humor in this way, and can it do anything else besides making people feel bad?

Usage

Obviously, this theory cannot adequately explain all things people find funny (Morreall, Humor). However, my purpose here is to track how people think and talk about humor, and people frequently make statements when writing and talking about jokes and comics that sound a lot like this theory. The idea of superiority is still very much “in play.”

Political Potential

People who think of humor as ridicule tend to be concerned with how humor operates socially, and how it affects power in relationships. Superiority Theory works well for political critics as it grants ideological force to the humor; we think the humor does something.  This allows critics such as Joanne Gilbert, Lisa Gring-Pemble and Martha Soloman Watson to analyze the ways in which power is being (mis)used.  But what does it do?  Generally, two ideas have emerged: that it creates social differences and hierarchies that then constrain or restrict our actions, or that is destroys or levels social differences and hierarchies, which empowers us.

Social Constraint

Originally, humor was believed to serve as a form of social constraint – to reinforce a social hierarchy (Mulkay).  So we can laugh at or ridicule people to point out their bad behavior and keep them in line, and powerful people laugh at all the little people to demonstrate their dominance.

Social Empowerment

However, cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas argues that humor can just as easily work as an attack meant to level social hierarchies – an act of social empowerment. So we can ridicule and laugh at systemic problems, like bureaucracies, racism, sexism, etc.

I’ve already mentioned “laughing at,” but there’s also the idea of “laughing with.” Joanne Gilbert talks about the difference between a victim, one who is harmed in the story of the joke, and a butt, the one who is responsible.  While they can be the same thing, we laugh with the victims at the butts.  So we can laugh with black people at a racist system, and in that laughter, show our opposition to the racism.  This is what I argue Sarah Silverman does with her “chink” joke.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Extensions? Applications?

References:

Aristotle. The Rhetoric.

Berger, Arthur Asa. “Humor: An Introduction.” American Behavioral Scientist 30.1 (1987): 6-15

Douglas, Mary. “Jokes.” Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies. Eds. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 291-310.

Gilbert, Joanne. Performing Marginality: Humor, Gender and Cultural Critique. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, 2004.

Gring-Pemble, Lisa and Martha Solomon Watson. “The Rhetorical Limits of Satire: An Analysis of James Finn Garner’s Politically Correct Bedtime Stories.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 89.2 (2003): 132-53.

Hobbes, Thomas. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Part I, Human Nature, Part II, De Corpore Politico; with Three lives. Ed. J.C.A. Gaskin. New York: Oxford University, 1994.

Morreal, John, ed., The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1987.

—-. “Philosophy of Humor.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html, 2016

Mulkay, Michael. On Humor: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. New York: Basil, 1988.

Plato, Philebus.

Wilson, Nathan. “Divisive Comedy: A Critical Examination of Audience Power.”  Participations: Journal of Audience and Reception Studies 8.2 (2011): 276-291.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Humorous Modes

Update!

Today’s update is on the three main theories that have emerged from philosophy, psychology and linguistics to explain humor (Berger; Meyer; Morreall; Raskin):

Superiority

Relief and

Incongruity

You can read up on each of them.

A Theoretical Argument

These theories are generally used to try to explain humor, and theorists, philosophers, psychologists and critics of every stripe have argued for centuries about the supremacy of one theory over another.  Incongruity is currently winning, as superiority and relief have fallen out of vogue. I don’t spend a lot of time on these, 1) because you can find longer descriptions elsewhere, and 2) because a lot of the finer points don’t relate well to stand up. Further, I refer to the “my theory is better than your theory” arguments as a quagmire that misses the point, which for me is: What do people think they are trying to accomplish when they make and consume humor?

Modes

I treat these theories as “modes,” or “a way or manner in which something occurs or is experienced, expressed, or done”  When I’m reading people talk about stand-up, whether it be writing tips, reviews, or critiques, I see moments when people say things that sound very much like one of these modes.

What I try to do in my critiques is try to point out or highlight these moments, because I argue they have implications for what the humor is thought to do. I find that these theories are not abandoned by normal people when other models come onto the scene, but rather each new model comes to be understood through these older theories, creating permutations.  This makes these modes central to understanding how humor is used, so here we go!

References:

Berger, Arthur Asa.  “Humor: An Introduction.”  American Behavioral Scientist 30.1 (1987): 6-15

Meyer, John C.  “Humor as a Double-Edged Sword: Four Functions of Humor in Communication.”  Communication Theory 10.3 (2000): 310-331.

Morreall, J. “Philosophy of Humor”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/humor/#RelThe, 2016.

Raskin, Victor.  Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. Boston, MA: D. Reidel. 1985.

Wilson, Nathan. Was That Supposed to be Funny?  A Rhetorical Analysis of Politics, Problems and Contradictions in Contemporary Stand-Up Comedy. Dissertation in partial completion of the Ph.D. August, 2008.

Bill Maher’s “N-Bomb” Wasn’t a Big Deal, But Neither Was It Funny.

Warning: “explicit language.”

Bill Maher said the “N-word” (Bailey, DeMarche, Guerrasio, Italiano, Itzkoff, Kiefer, Lopez, Obeidallah, Parker, Phillips, Sasse, Schultz, Sharpton, Wamsley).

Or did he say “n—-r” (Guerrasio, Herreria & Morgan, Schultz, Sieczkowski)? Or did he say “n—–” (Littleton, Phillips)?  Or did he say “n*****” (Bailey, Lopez, Obeidallah)?  The “N-bomb” (Italiano)?  Or just “[expletive]” (DeMarche)?

He said…

As both rapper Killer Mike, a frequent guest on the show, and (white) Twitter critic James Burgos note – and here I’ll quote Chris Rock talking about the Michael Richards incident from 2006 – “He said Nigger.”

As I ask my college classes: What’s the difference?  We all know the word to which we refer with these other terms.

Is it better than saying the word if I quote Chris Rock, or if New York Times columnists Dave Itzkoff or Wesley Morris or Twitter critic, James Burgos, quotes Bill Maher himself using the term?

What if I just included the clip of Maher saying the word, as does Jason Guerrasio of Business Insider, Carla Herreria & Lee Moran of the Huffington Post, Laura Italiano of Page Six, Kristine Phillips of the Washington Post, German Lopez of Vox, and as does prominent Black Lives Matter Activist DeRay McKesson in his Tweet? Dean Obedallah of NPR delivers one of the most scathing critiques of Maher, yet his column is accompanied by a pop-up of the clip that is difficult to avoid – NSFW indeed.  What if I just include McKesson’s or Burgos’ Tweet, which includes the word or the clip, as do Itzkoff and Halle Kiefer of Vulture.com respectively?

Why does one of these “refer” to the word, without carrying the same baggage as the word itself? Is it hypocritical to critique Maher, while perpetuating the violence you claim he inflicted?  And why does the word necessarily carry baggage at all? Shouldn’t we be looking at the usage?

Perhaps this is a deeper discussion than we need to get into here, and I and many others have addressed some of it elsewhere (for perhaps the best example, see Judith Butler, Excitable Speech, 1997).  Suffice it to say that I’m one of those who argues that we give words power, and making a word taboo only increases that power and limits what it can do. In the immortal words of Hermione Granger:

Instead, we should allow the word to change meanings with use; basically that writing the word when talking about it is not the same as calling someone one. However, Michael Eric Dyson might be changing my mind on this, so I’ll not drop it again.

However, this brief introduction does lead to the better questions:

“What’s the joke?” and “Where did he cross the line”?

Is the joke the use of the word, or is there something else there?  For many, it’s unclear why the comments are offensive. In a public statement, HBO vaguely denounced the remark as ‘completely inexcusable and tasteless,” and vowed to edit the “deeply offensive comment.”  But what made it offensive?

For some, the problem is “Maher’s poor attempt at trying to get a few laughs by invoking the ‘N-word'” (Obeidallah). Dave Itzkoff calls the word a “racial epithet,” which seems softer than Edmund DeMarche of Fox News, Carla Herreria & Lee Moran and also Cavan Sieczkowski of the Huffington Post, and Kristine Phillips of the Washington Post, who call it a “racial slur.”

Similarly, German Lopez of Vox states that Maher “crossed one of those lines that should never be crossed: He dropped the N-word on live television.”

Sen. Ben Sasse (R-Neb.), also had a problem with the word, Tweeting,

I’m a 1st Amendment absolutist. Comedians get latitude to cross hard lines. But free speech comes with a responsibility to speak up when folks use that word. Me just cringing last night wasn’t good enough. Here’s what I wish I’d been quick enough to say in the moment: ‘Hold up, why would you think it’s OK to use that word? … The history of the n-word is an attack on universal human dignity. It’s therefore an attack on the American Creed. Don’t use it.’

Rev. Al Sharpton also took umbrage with the use of the word, stating that such use “normalized” it: “He doesn’t get a pass because we’re friends,” Sharpton said. “What Bill Maher did was normalize a word that is anything but normal.” Sharpton said civil rights activists must be consistent in their outrage when the N-word is used – even by their friends.

Maher himself apologized for “the word I used in the banter of a live moment. The word was offensive, and I regret saying it and am very sorry.”

Doubtless, one could laugh at the use of the word.  Used to refer to Maher, it’s incongruous and unexpected, it’s also particularly base, which makes it’s use both carnivalesque (in the simple sense) and thereby invokes tension that begs for release.  Extending this farther, one could just laugh at a feeling of superiority over minorities, or for that matter over Maher for thinking the term could apply to him.  We can’t go back and poll the audience after the fact in any meaningful way, so we can only state possibilities.

If Maher were simply going for a laugh at the use of the word, especially in shock and surprise at its use, then it falls under obscene or “blue humor,” which follows the logic of the “dick joke.”

Dick jokes vs. Sexual jokes

Betsy Borns differentiates the dick joke from sexual jokes as based on “what makes the joke funny: if people laugh because the word ‘fuck’ is used, that’s a dick joke (and an easy laugh); if people laugh in reacting to an insightful observation about sex, that’s a sexual joke” (45).

In the hierarchy of comedy, sexual jokes are generally considered “better,” as dick jokes garner cheap laughs.  So we ask, is the racial equivalent of a dick joke?  Maher himself would argue yes.

However, for some it’s so much more.  Dean Obeidallah of CNN characterizes it as “A white comedian co-opting the horrific suffering of slaves for a joke and for some media attention.” He further states, “This was truly white privilege on parade. You have Maher and a white Republican senator yucking it up over a racial epithet and the plight of slaves.” While the word was also a problem, Obeidallah notes,

It wasn’t a joke that took on a person in power. It was the opposite. Maher’s joke made light of the darkest time in American history while using a word that white supremacists used to dehumanize a race of people.

In a tweet addressing Maher and Griffin, Cornell William Brooks, president of the NAACP, said: “Great comedians make us think & laugh. When our humanity is the punchline, it hurts too much to think or laugh.”

Intentionality

However, this requires us to believe that Bill Maher, in an unscripted interview, was making light of the “plight of slaves” and “the darkest time in American history” (and further, that he knew, in advance, that he’d gain media attention).  I’d love to give Maher that much credit, but I can’t.

Further, as I’ve argued elsewhere, a standard notion in stand-up – which is, after all, where Maher began – is that comics are primarily trying to make us laugh.  That’s their primary intention.

Political activist and blogger Egberto Willies notes the lack of intended harm: “We spent an inordinate amount of time on a joke that was clearly said without malice.”

Larry King also came to Maher’s defense, saying on Twitter that he’s been friends with the comic for years “and there’s not a racist bone in his body. Let’s accept his apology and move on.”  While we may not be able to accept this latter absence of racism on face, the former claim of no malice seems likely.

Summary

A general premise of my criticism is that good (ethical, just) comedy maximizes the ways marginalized people are lifted up or empowered by possible interpretations of the joke, and minimizes the possible ways they are belittled or ridiculed by the joke.  By this standard, Maher doesn’t fare well.

My take is that Maher seemed to try to be self-deprecating in the presence of a Republican Senator from a red state by casting himself as a “city slicker,” but that term, we can agree, wouldn’t have been very funny.  So instead he went with the dick joke/”N-bomb.”

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Maher heard “field,” and in a hurried search for the most humorous of all the uses of and references to the term that his audience would get, came up with “field n—-r,” and put himself in opposition to that as a “house n—-r.”  It was a bit too simple and for that, alone, we could critique him.

Further, by comparing himself to a slave, yes, he does to an extent make light of their plight.  Not his finest hour.

[Update 6/6/2017] I wanted to clarify here: If he had said “house slave” it would be no better.  It makes light not just because he’s making a hyperbolic comparison – like someone saying “woe is me, I’m practically a slave” – but because he doesn’t even have a basis of bad treatment or lack of compensation, let alone threat of punishment, to warrant such a comparison.  Yeah, rich media talking head… Totally a slave.

Further still, he knew it was wrong the moment he said it, because he hears something from the audience that led him to instantly clarify, “It’s a joke!”  I’ve talked elsewhere about the “I’m joking/Just kidding” defense. By that immediate defense, which would be unnecessary had the line been a good one, he displays the heart of the problem – it wasn’t.

Kathy Griffin Produced Art, and Art has Consequences.

I should begin by saying, I’ve never really been a fan.

She had moments and jokes, and I’m always in favor of people who advocate for gender and sexual preference equality, LGBTQ rights, etc.; however, I just never sought out more of her work.

So now she poses with the bloody mask of the 45th President, and there’s been a huge backlash, including her losing several jobs and opportunities, so I gotta weigh in: Was it comedy?  Was it political commentary?  Was it free speech?  All/Some/None of the above?  How does this impact comedy, comics and real-live people?

Reading through the response in the press, we can see a number of themes.  Let’s begin with the writing of Noah Michelson of the Huffington Post, and we’ll spin off from there.

Crossing the line

Michelson notes,

You can’t stage a photo like Griffin’s without freaking people out. It’s grisly, gruesome, provocative and, sure, distasteful and even disrespectful. But that’s the point.

He goes on to compare it to the Naked Trump Statue and Trump/Putin Makeout Mural as images meant to shock, inspire and incite resistance; it “intend[s] to offend in order to highlight the offenses we’re experiencing.”

Michelson quotes Jim Carrey from an “Entertainment Tonight” interview:

I think it is the job of a comedian to cross the line at all times — because that line is not real…. If you step out into that spotlight and you’re doing the crazy things that [Trump] is doing, we’re the last line of defense. And, really, the comedians are the last voice of truth in this whole thing.

Carrey is not alone, Alec Baldwin has also spoke out on her behalf.

Crossing the line is how Griffin frames it in her early responses: as provocative art that “mocks” and draws attention to the violence of the administration, not one that condones violence towards the administration.  Griffin has since offered a simple, heartfelt video-apology. “I sincerely apologize,” Griffin said.

I’m just now seeing the reaction to these images. I’m a comic. I crossed the line. I moved the line, then I crossed it. I went way too far.

This idea of humor operating as an attack on boundaries to question the system is fairly common; it’s the basis of the Relief theory.  But rather than just violating a taboo, it might be the first step toward a political action [as I’ve argued elsewhere].

If you can’t say ‘fuck,’ you can’t say ‘Fuck the government!’

Lenny Bruce said, “If you can’t say ‘fuck,’ you can’t say ‘fuck the government.'” Superiority theory holds that when humor – even base humor – is used to attack the status quo it is a force for change – though not always to our benefit, as may be the case here.  Hell, many people said that about Bruce. We should note that ridicule can also work down the power hierarchy, enforcing the status quo by attacking those on the boundary.  Also, hyperbolic violations of the status quo can ironically reinforce it, as may also be the case here.

This was the case in Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of the (simple) Carnivalesque, where the space and time of the Carnival allows the participants to engage in base, grotesque and profane humor. For some critics, the fact that it is allowed in this limited space only reinforces that this behavior is NOT that in which we can engage day-to-day.

Speaking Truth to Power

Another point embedded in this discussion is the idea that comics speak truth to power, especially when they are “the last voice of truth.”  This is the idea that the guise of a comic and the particular space that it provides gives license to say things that the rest of us cannot.  This is also an overly glowing view of comedy, as it is rarely used and frequently abused to ridicule the oppressed.

We all have the ability and responsibility to speak truth to power.  Comics are objectively neither specially privileged, nor receive special dispensation, as Griffin’s case (and every other that has come before) adequately displays – unless we defend their actions.  The space of humor is neither guaranteed nor safe, it is constantly under assault and requires constant defense by people who find such a space useful.  And this can be difficult, as truths are plural and situational.

Michelson calls out supposed free speech advocates for not supporting her, and liberals and progressives for attacking her and I have seen countless images on Facebook and Twitter, displaying the way one side reacted to the Anti-Obama hate and comparing it to how the same group reacted to the 45-hate, when it’s objectively the same argument.  One side feels (rightly or wrongly) that the other guy will destroy their way of life, and speaks out to “incite resistance,” and when the other side does/has done the same, they decry it as inciting violence.

Yes, it’s problematic that the Anti-Obama hate took the form of traditionally racist imagery and “metaphors,” and yes, few (if any) of them claimed to be “just kidding,” but the tu quoque (“you also”) fallacy applies to the basic behaviors of both sides.

Art teaches about life

Griffin “shouldn’t be silenced,” Michelson writes,

Because when we silence art, when we tell creative people to stop pushing boundaries, we miss the opportunity to have healthy, difficult conversations around what it means to be an American and how and why we should participate in how our country operates, especially at this dire moment in our history…. Ultimately, I saw Griffin doing the tricky, difficult work of calling out her own government in an era ― like so many before in our history ― when dissent is labeled as poisonous, if not treasonous... In these confusing, panic-inducing times, I want to be challenged. I want to be forced to reconsider what I think is ‘right’ and what’s ‘wrong.’ I want an outlet for my anger and I want the chance ― however rare ― to laugh.

This is perhaps my favorite part of Michelson’s discussion: the idea that art incites conversations that, while sometimes difficult, are necessary for a free and healthy democracy.  This has been my point in my published work (since 2008), and I’m glad to see the idea getting some traction.

Intentions

But now we’re all starting to calm down, take a breath, and look at it more objectively. Michelson states,

No, we don’t have to like what she did. We can think and say it is tacky or gross or juvenile, but we can also defend her right to do it and attempt to understand her reasoning.

And Griffin intended to offend, in order to incite discussion, but not violence.

As I’m arguing in current work, intentionality is a funny thing.  Many critics note that the comic’s main goal is to entertain – usually expressed by audience laughter.  John Limon’s theory is that if (part of/enough of) the audience laughs, it’s a funny joke.  However, the audience doesn’t have to laugh at the intention – they don’t have to “get it” – they laugh at their interpretation – including, perhaps, the voice, pantomime, or manner of the comic.  If the intention doesn’t factor into the humor, should it factor into the effects?  If communication is the shared interpretation of messages, then intention is a factor, but not a determining force.

Consequences of Art

Michelson claims Griffin’s picture, unlike 45’s speech, doesn’t have consequences. Perhaps hers is, like it or not, more like Ted Nugent’s speeches; although Nugent claims his statements were “metaphors,” whereas Griffin’s is  “symbolism,” we could note, as he does that “They [the Secret Service] concluded, absolutely conclusively, I did not threaten anybody’s life.”  We might further note that the Secret Service were still compelled to look into it.

Here’s the rub: we can’t claim that Griffin’s speech act incites conversations, and at the same time guarantee it won’t promote physical action.  Just as we couldn’t for Nugent, or for the president.  Objectively, Griffin and our 45th President had similar bases of power – it is only now that he has (some) control of the reins of government.

Certainly, the photo has had consequences for Griffin, and not all of those were orchestrated by the president, but neither were they entirely her fault, as this meme would claim. Ultimately, it’s the collective response that will determine if her career is over or not, if we’re going to have meaningful discussion or not.  Or if we’re going to shut down attempts at political dissent that engage in violent (and/or racist) imagery, even when made by a comic.

Summary

Kathy Griffin displays the limits of a comic’s license to cross lines and speak truth to power.  Art initiates opportunities to discuss, but that discussion still has to be brought forward – and this is true of any political discussion, however it is initiated. Because Griffin cannot hide behind her (after the fact) statements of intentions, she cannot be insulated from the consequences, but neither is she necessarily responsible.  We the audience must determine what actions we choose to translate the discussion.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts? Problems?